Open Meetings and Closed Mouths: Elected Officials\u27 Free Speech Rights after \u3ci\u3eGarcetti v. Ceballos\u3c/i\u3e by Diehl, Christopher J.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 2
2010
Open Meetings and Closed Mouths: Elected
Officials' Free Speech Rights after Garcetti v. Ceballos
Christopher J. Diehl
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Christopher J. Diehl, Open Meetings and Closed Mouths: Elected Officials' Free Speech Rights after Garcetti v. Ceballos, 61 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 551 (2010)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol61/iss2/6





OPEN MEETINGS AND CLOSED 
MOUTHS: ELECTED OFFICIALS’ 
FREE SPEECH RIGHTS AFTER 
GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS  
“Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his 
judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he 
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 This is a play off of the Article entitled Open Meetings and Closed Minds: Another 
Road to the Mountaintop, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 11 (2004) by Nicholas Johnson.  
1 EDMUND BURKE, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT 
HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 2, 10 (1826).  
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 21, 2004, Katie Elms-Lawrence e-mailed three of her 
fellow Alpine City Councilpersons to arrange a special meeting. Her 
email spoke of the City’s ongoing search for an engineering firm and 
the fact that she had just discussed one of the candidates they had 
recently interviewed with Councilwoman Monclova. “[W]e both feel 
Mr. Tom Brown was the most impressive . . . no need for 
interviewing another engineer at this time,”2 her email read. Three 
days later, Councilman Rangra responded to the e-mail and copied 
two other councilpersons, saying that he would arrange the meeting. 
Little did they know that this seemingly innocent exchange of emails 
would lead District Attorney Frank Brown to indict Rangra, Elms-
Lawrence, Monclova, and another council member on criminal 
charges of violating the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA) several 
months later.3  
The District Attorney ultimately dropped the criminal charges, but 
Rangra and Monclova filed a declaratory action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, seeking a judgment that the criminal provisions of TOMA 
violated their First Amendment rights under the Free Speech Clause 
and were unconstitutional both on their face and as applied to their 
particular situation.4 The United States District Court for the Western 
                                                                                                                 
2 Rangra v. Brown, No. P-05-CV-075, 2006 WL 3327634, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 
2006), rev’d, 566 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2009), dismissed as moot en banc by 584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
3 Id. at *3 (“The prosecution was based solely on the exchange of the e-mails.”). 
4 Id. at *1–2.  
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District of Texas dismissed the suit,5 reasoning that, because the 
council members spoke in their official capacity, the First 
Amendment had no application.6 A panel of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that TOMA acted as 
a content-based restriction on the councilmember’s speech (a 
designation that makes the Act inherently suspect) and remanded the 
case with instructions for the district court to apply strict scrutiny.7 
The Fifth Circuit voted to rehear the matter en banc;8 however, before 
the court heard arguments, it issued a one-line order dismissing the 
case for mootness.9  
Although the entire Fifth Circuit declined to reach the merits of the 
appeal, the panel’s decision raises some interesting—and, indeed, far-
reaching—questions regarding the free speech rights of elected 
officials and how open meeting laws may impinge upon these 
freedoms. Part I of this Note provides some background on the 
development of open meeting laws, including their pervasiveness and 
commonly perceived benefits and drawbacks. Part II then discusses 
the extent to which the Free Speech Clause of the Federal 
Constitution should apply to elected officials acting in their official 
capacity. While some courts have held that the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos10 limits the free speech rights of all 
government employees acting in their official capacity, this Note 
argues that courts should treat elected officials differently. Rather 
than having their rights hamstrung, elected officials should receive 
the full protection of the First Amendment, even when acting in their 
official capacities, because the nature of their relationship with their 
“employer” is different from that of other government employees. 
This Note argues that there are sufficient common-law justifications 
for extending elected officials the full protections of the First 
Amendment, and that Garcetti does nothing to alter this doctrine. Part 
                                                                                                                 
5 Id. at *8.  
6 Id. at *6.  
7 Rangra v. Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 526–27 (5th Cir. 2009), dismissed as moot en banc by 
584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that there was a fundamental difference between an elected 
official’s role as a “state employee” and the role of ordinary state employees). 
8 Rangra v. Brown, 576 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2009). 
9 Rangra v. Brown, 584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009). The vote was 16-1. Id at 207. Judge 
Dennis (the author of the original panel opinion) issued a scathing dissent in which he intimated 
that the “mootness” the court perceived stemmed from the fact that, during the four years of 
litigation, all of the plaintiffs had either been defeated in their bids for re-election, or had been 
prevented from running because of term-limits. Id. at 207–08 (Dennis, J., dissenting). He also 
noted: “The only reason that has been advanced for dismissing this case prior to the date upon 
which it had been set for en banc rehearing and oral argument, is that it would overtax the 
judges of this court to prepare for oral argument on both the mootness question and the merits of 
the appeal.” Id. at 209.  
10 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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III then looks at the various levels of First Amendment scrutiny 
employed by the courts. After giving a brief overview of the two most 
common forms of speech restriction (content-neutral and content-
based burdens), this Note argues that open meeting laws actually 
regulate speech based upon subject matter. Subject-matter restrictions 
pose a particular conundrum for courts as they can perpetuate the 
same evils as either content-neutral or content-based burdens, 
depending upon the circumstances. As such, courts should adjust the 
level of scrutiny brought to bear on subject-matter restrictions in 
accordance with the underlying First Amendment dangers that the 
particular restriction poses. This requires a more nuanced analysis, 
rather than a mechanical application of strict scrutiny. 
Part IV then uses this framework to analyze both TOMA and the 
Ohio open meeting law. It concludes that open meeting laws, which 
choke off all means of communication on the subject of political 
issues, pose a threat to free discussion and are contrary to basic First 
Amendment principles. Furthermore, open meeting laws that impose 
criminal penalties on individual violators are particularly insidious 
because of the significant chilling effect they create. Finally, Part V 
proposes several steps that states can take to reduce the burdens on 
their elected officials’ First Amendment rights, including dispensing 
with criminal penalties and clearly defining “meeting” in their 
statutes. And, contrary to some critics’ contentions, these remedies 
will enhance, rather than dilute, the level and quality of debate in 
public bodies.  
I. OPEN MEETING LAWS 
Though many assume there is a constitutional “right” to attend 
meetings of the government, this assumption is incorrect; there is, in 
fact, no generally recognized common law or constitutional right for 
the public to attend governmental meetings.11 However, every state 
                                                                                                                 
11 ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, OPEN MEETING LAWS § 1.1 (2d ed. 2000). See also Sandra F. 
Chance & Christina Locke, The Government-in-the-Sunshine Law Then and Now: A Model for 
Implementing New Technologies Consistent with Florida’s Position as a Leader in Open 
Government, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2008) (“[T]he right of the public to attend 
government meetings is granted by government officials, not the common law. . . . [T]here is no 
First Amendment right of access to government meetings.” (footnote omitted)). Although some 
might analogize the right of access to government meetings with the right of access to criminal 
trials, this analogy is inapposite. The public does, of course, have a presumptive constitutional 
right to attend criminal trials. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555, 580 (1980) (“We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of 
the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for 
centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and ‘of the press could be eviscerated.’” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972))). 
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currently has some form of open meeting law.12 Though laws 
requiring open government are actually a relatively new creation,13 
the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate have met in 
public for the vast majority of their existence.14 Despite these early 
inklings of openness, had open meeting laws been around in the 
Eighteenth Century, the United States as we know it today may never 
have come about—the Founders conducted the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 in total secrecy.15  
Open meeting laws did not begin to crop up in a significant 
fashion until the middle of the Twentieth Century. Alabama is 
thought to have enacted the first “open meeting” law in 1915. And, as 
late as 1950, it remained the lone state with a “comprehensive” open 
meetings statute.16 In the years immediately following Watergate, 
however, the states with open meeting laws rushed to expand them 
and those without hastily enacted their own.17 Today, open meeting 
laws have become so important to the appearance of open 
government that over half the states make some mention of open 
government in their constitutions.18  
A. Why Sunshine Is the Best Disinfectant 
The need for open meeting laws grew out of the impression that a 
great deal of state and local decision making took place “behind 
closed doors.”19 Perhaps this perception is what led Justice Brandeis 
to remark: “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and 
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
                                                                                                                 
12 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 3 (noting that these laws go by several names, 
including “‘sunshine’ laws, open door laws, freedom of access acts, right to know laws, or 
public meeting laws” (footnotes omitted)). 
13 Id. 
14 See Teresa Dale Pupillo, Note, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the 
Sunshine in the 1990’s—An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165, 1167 
(1993) (“Deliberations of the House of Representatives and the Senate were not opened to 
reporters until 1790 and 1792 respectively.”). However, most congressional committees 
continued to meet in private until the 1970s. SCHWING, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 2.  
15 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.15 (1974) (“[A]ll records of those 
meetings were sealed for more than 30 years after the Convention. Most of the Framers 
acknowledged that without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed could have 
been written.” (internal citations omitted)).  
16 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 3. 
17 Id. § 1.1, at 3–4. Chief Justice Warren famously remarked: “If anything is to be learned 
from our present difficulties, compendiously known as Watergate, it is that we must open our 
public affairs to public scrutiny on every level of government.” Earl Warren, Governmental 
Secrecy: Corruption’s Ally, 60 A.B.A. J. 550, 550 (1974). 
18 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 2.  
19 Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the “Right to Know,” 75 HARV. L. 
REV. 1199, 1199 (1962) [hereinafter The Right to Know]. 
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electric light the most efficient policeman.”20 But even this idea 
needed decades to find traction. It wasn’t until the early 1960’s that 
the public (or, more specifically, the media) sent the drive for open 
meeting laws into high gear by sounding the now familiar rallying cry 
of “[t]he people have a right to know!”21 
This sentiment—the “right” to know—was one of the main ideas 
driving the enactment of open meeting laws. In short, the principle is 
that government officials should conduct the public’s business in 
public.22 This principle is rooted in the idea that “government is and 
should be the servant of the people.”23 Open meeting laws facilitate 
that service by “promot[ing] the free flow of information so that news 
media may report events accurately rather than relying on potentially 
biased or inaccurate leaks.”24 Thus, open meetings encourage 
confidence in elected officials and reduce corruption.25 According to 
some scholars, this openness allows the public to become more 
involved in the decision-making process and affords them a better 
understanding of the nuances of modern government.26  
                                                                                                                 
20 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(1914). 
21 The Right to Know, supra note 19, at 1199.  
22 See SCHWING, supra note 11, § 3.2, at 22–23 (“The overriding public policy is that 
government is the public’s business and should be conducted in public so that the basis and 
rationale for governmental decisions as well as the decisions themselves are easily accessible to 
the people.” (footnote omitted)).  
23 Lisa A. Reilly, The Government in the Sunshine Act and the Privacy Act, 55 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 955, 956 (1986) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-880, at 2 (1976)). 
24 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 3.6, at 33. Schwing goes on to note that other common 
justifications include:  
 promotion of stability and public confidence in government;  
 improved ability of the people to evaluate public officials and their activities by being 
privy to the decision-making process so that the public can vote intelligently in elections;  
 improved understanding of the decision-making process that enables people to consider 
future government developments and the consequences of those developments;  
 enhancement of the fact-finding process, because discrepancies and omissions can be 
discovered and revealed, persons giving evidence are less able to conceal falsehood, and perjury 
can be more easily discovered;  
 greater control of governmental abuses;  
 increased citizen participation in government; and  
 better government responsiveness to the needs of the governed.  
Id. § 3.6, at 34.  
25 See Pupillo, supra note 14, at 1166 (“Open meetings allow the public to observe how 
their elected officials vote on issues. This information allows  members of the public to 
determine if public officials are truly acting in a representative capacity.”). 
26 See, e.g., Michael A. Lawrence, Finding Shade from the “Government in the Sunshine 
Act”: A Proposal to Permit Private Informal Background Discussions at the United States 
International Trade Commission, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1995) (“Some proponents argue 
that the openness of agency meetings allows the public to more clearly understand how the 
government decisionmaking process operates, thereby leading to a greater opportunity for 
public involvement in the process through enlightened voting and lobbying.”).  
 2/14/2011 4:20:03 PM 
2011] OPEN MEETINGS AND CLOSED MOUTHS 555 
While several states go so far as to explicitly outline the rationale 
for open meetings in their constitutions,27 others simply include these 
public policy justifications in their statutory schemes.28 Whatever the 
form and wherever the locale, the underlying rationale is essentially 
the same: open access to governmental decisions and deliberations is 
an overriding public policy goal.29  
B. But Too Much Disinfectant Can Be Toxic  
Though originally touted30—and still heralded—by the media as 
the best tonic for flushing out corrupt practices in government, open 
meeting laws are not without their detractors.31 Though most 
commentators generally agree that the ideals of open government and 
accountability are laudable, some take issue with the mechanism for 
attaining those goals.  
The most consistent criticism of open meeting laws is that they 
limit free debate and discussion among elected officials (and 
members of other agency bodies subject to the laws) and drive the 
substantive exchange of ideas further into the shadows.32 The 
resulting loss of collegiality among the voting members of a public 
body forces members to lean more heavily on their unelected staffs. 
                                                                                                                 
27 See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. VIII (“All power residing originally in, and being 
derived from, the people, all the magistrates and officers of government are their substitutes and 
agents, and at all times accountable to them. Government, therefore, should be open, accessible, 
accountable and responsive. To that end, the public’s right of access to governmental 
proceedings and records shall not be unreasonably restricted.”).  
28 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 3.2, at 22–23.  
29 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 21.1 (West 2010) (“This chapter seeks to assure, through 
a requirement of open meetings of governmental bodies, that the basis and rationale of 
governmental decisions, as well as those decisions themselves, are easily accessible to the 
people. Ambiguity in the construction or application of this chapter should be resolved in favor 
of openness.”). 
30 See The Right to Know, supra note 19, at 1199 (“Organized activities to this end [the 
enactment of open meeting laws] began in 1950 when the Freedom of Information Committee 
of the American Society of Newspaper Editors directed its attention to the problems of domestic 
news suppression. . . . [T]he press . . . has remained the principal moving force behind the 
campaign.” (footnote omitted)).  
31 See, e.g., Nicholas Johnson, Open Meetings and Closed Minds: Another Road to the 
Mountaintop, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 11, 13 (2004) (“[Open meeting laws] often create more barriers 
to the attainment of [their] objectives than if the laws did not exist.”); Lawrence, supra note 26, 
at 11 (noting that officials of major regulatory agencies “believed that the presence of the press 
and public under open meeting statutes subtly inhibit[s] the free exchange of ideas and 
opinions.”). 
32 E.g., Johnson, supra note 31, at 25–29; see also David M. Welborn et al., The Federal 
Government in the Sunshine Act and Agency Decision Making, 20 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 465, 473 
(1989) (“Among the more important [inhibitions] reported by agency participants are . . . [that 
the laws] ‘take the sting out of debate,’ as one member put it; . . . impede development of an 
informed consensus among members after a thorough exchange of views; and . . . generally 
limit the flow of information, the depth of critical collective scrutiny given to matters before the 
agency, and strategic speculation and planning.”).  
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Thus, many public officials now conduct any significant, substantive 
discussions on complex and controversial policy questions with their 
staff members, rather than with the other members of the public 
body.33  
From 1976–1982, Professor David Welborn surveyed the effects 
of the newly enacted Government in the Sunshine Act (the federal 
“open meeting law”).34 His study found that, in the period just prior to 
the enactment of the Act, 80.1% of agency members responding felt 
that their agency discussed “important matters” in formal meetings.35 
An overwhelming number of respondents (over 85%) also indicated 
that they made their decisions on most issues after these discussions 
in formal meetings.36 Welborn then surveyed members of the affected 
bodies after the Federal Sunshine Law took effect, and the vast 
majority of respondents (over 83%) noted that they now came to 
conclusions about issues prior to the formal discussions at these new 
“open meetings.”37 
This likely explains the sharper criticism leveled against those 
states with laws barring pre-decisional discussions. These states go so 
far as to forbid members of a public body to “hear, discuss, [or] 
deliberate . . . on any item that is within the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the legislative body,” outside of an open meeting.38 While the 
likely purpose of these prohibitions is to prevent members of public 
bodies from meeting in small groups—thereby evading open meeting 
requirements—these broad prohibitions are cumbersome to enforce 
and strict adherence is, in most cases, unrealistic.39  
Viewing open meeting laws in the context of the First Amendment 
magnifies these concerns, especially when the state imposes criminal 
penalties on violators. Though some states do provide limited 
                                                                                                                 
33 See Kathy Bradley, Note, Do You Feel the Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine Act: 
Its Objectives, Goals, and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 483 (1997) 
(“Since a commissioner may not discuss or debate with all of her colleagues, she will often turn 
to discussions with staff members.”).  
34 Welborn, supra note 32, at 466.  
35 Id. at 471. 
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54952.2(a) (West 2010). See also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 551.001(4)(A) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (“‘Meeting’ means: a deliberation between a 
quorum of a governmental body, or between a quorum of a governmental body and another 
person, during which public business or public policy over which the governmental body has 
supervision or control is discussed or considered or during which the governmental body takes 
formal action . . . .”).  
39 See Johnson, supra note 31, at 15 (“To capture all discussions merely because they are 
called deliberations is an impossibility. To try to do so only guarantees that fewer discussions 
and deliberations will take place, and that fewer wise decisions will be made.”).  
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exceptions for chance encounters or social gatherings,40 the chilling 
effect these provisions can have on speech is of paramount concern.  
C. And What’s Really in this “Best of Disinfectants”? 
Although the laws vary from state to state in scope, content, and 
application, they have a number of similar veins. For instance, the 
vast majority of states apply their open meeting laws to almost all of 
their political subdivisions.41 Additionally, every state requires open 
meetings of public bodies unless a specific statute or provision 
authorizes a closed meeting.42 In order to have an “open meeting,” the 
body must publish (usually several days in advance) notice of the 
time, place, and (in some states) scope of the meeting.43 Generally, 
most states also break meetings down into three categories: regular, 
special, and emergency, with slightly less burdensome notification 
requirements for the latter two.44  
Despite these overarching similarities, the reach and “bite” of open 
meeting acts still varies widely from state to state.45 One way to judge 
the scope and effect of a state’s open meeting law is to look at how 
the statute defines “meeting.”46 Some, like Texas, define the term 
broadly. Under the Texas Code, a “meeting” is defined as: “a 
deliberation between a quorum of a governmental body, or between a 
quorum of a governmental body and another person, during which 
public business or public policy over which the governmental body 
has supervision or control is discussed or considered or during which 
the governmental body takes formal action.”47 Other states, like Ohio, 
                                                                                                                 
40 See SCHWING, supra note 11, § 6.52, at 312–14 (noting that some states forbid 
“informal” meetings of a quorum or more, other states allow these, so long as they comply with 
the open meeting law, and others merely state that informal meetings or chance encounters may 
not be used to circumvent the open meeting law).  
41 Id. § 4.22, at 72. Curiously, some of these same state legislatures see it fit to exempt 
themselves from these laws. Nevertheless, their own rules often require them to publish detailed 
minutes and/or a journal of their proceedings. See id. § 4.80, at 130–33.  
42 Id. § 6.4, at 258. (“[A]ll states have now elected to require open meetings in the absence 
of a specific provision requiring or permitting closure.”).  
43 See generally id. § 5. For example, Ohio requires that: “Every public body, by rule, 
shall establish a reasonable method whereby any person may determine the time and place of all 
regularly scheduled meetings and the time, place, and purpose of all special meetings.” OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(F) (West 1994 & Supp. 2009). Texas’s act is similar: “A 
governmental body shall give written notice of the date, hour, place, and subject of each 
meeting held by the governmental body.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.041.  
44 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 5.10, at 172. 
45 See id. §§ VI, VIII (discussing variations in states’ open meeting acts).  
46 Id. § 6.6, at 258.  
47 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.001(4). The statute also has several specific exceptions 
for “social functions,” even if a quorum is present, so long as either: there is no discussion of 
public business, or the discussion of public business is “incidental” to the function. Id. 
“Incidental,” is, of course, undefined. See id.  
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take a much narrower approach. The Ohio Revised Code simply 
defines a meeting as “any prearranged discussion of the public 
business of the public body by a majority of its members.”48 Part IV 
compares the way these two states define “meeting,” and how these 
varying definitions can have important implications for the 
constitutionality of the statute.  
Additionally, the level of enforcement and the accompanying 
penalties for violation vary greatly by state. For example, Ohio’s 
statute requires that the court invalidate any formal action that is not 
adopted in an open meeting.49 The statute also provides a civil fine of 
$500, court costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees.50 Provisions like 
these are common in nearly all states. Some states, however, go 
further, and impose criminal penalties on violators,51 often in the form 
of fines and/or imprisonment for up to six months.52 While most 
states require a knowing violation for the criminal penalties to kick in, 
a few states, such as Arkansas, even impose these criminal sanctions 
for merely negligent violations of their open meetings act.53 Statutes 
like these rest on particularly precarious constitutional footing 
because of the chilling effect they can have on core political speech.  
II. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS 
A complete journey through the muddled thicket of First 
Amendment theories is beyond the scope of this Note. Nonetheless, 
several guiding principles bear mentioning. Chief among these is the 
notion that free speech is indispensible to the idea of liberty and 
freedom of thought.54 Consequently, “debate on public issues should 
                                                                                                                 
48 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2). 
49 Id. § 121.22(H). Almost all states provide for this type of remedy. See SCHWING, supra 
note 11, § 8.62, at 513 & n.282 (collecting statutes and noting that “[a] number of statutes 
expressly require or empower the court to void any binding or final action taken at a meeting not 
in compliance with the open meeting law”).  
50 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(I)(1)–(2). 
51 See SCHWING, supra note 11, § 8.58 at 507–09 (describing various states' civil penalties 
for violations of open meeting laws);); see also id. § 8.62 at 513–26 (describing various state 
provisions which invalidate actions taken in violation of open meeting laws).  
52 Compare 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 714 (2010) (imposing fine of up to $100 plus cost 
of prosecution), with TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.143(b) (conviction punishable by fine of 
$100 to $500, or one to six months imprisonment, or both).  
53 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-104 (2004 & Supp. 2010) (“Any person who 
negligently violates any of the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a class C 
misdemeanor.”); id. § 5-4-401 (person convicted of a class C misdemeanor may be punished by 
up to 30 days in jail).  
54 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“[F]reedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the 
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would 
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the 
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that 
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be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”55 This encourages the free 
flow of thought and best facilitates the marketplace of ideas.56 While 
it would seem that this cornerstone of First Amendment law is in 
perfect harmony with the bedrock principle of open meeting laws 
(i.e., that meetings should be open in order to facilitate public 
understanding of the governing process), a brief glance over this 
rocky ledge belies this illusion and reveals the abyss below. 
The First Amendment also stands on the proposition that 
individuals should be free to decide for themselves, rather than be 
compelled by the government, what ideas they accept and want to 
express.57 The evil inherent in this so-called “compelled speech” is 
that it distorts the marketplace of ideas. If we allow the government 
not only to force the electorate to listen to the state’s views, but also 
to compel its citizens to advocate and spread those views, we give the 
government an extraordinary power to slant the marketplace to suit its 
whims. Thus, the right to refrain from speaking is just as important as 
the ability to enter the marketplace of ideas and advocate your own 
positions.  
Finally, the First Amendment is not absolute; its freedom is not 
unqualified.58 After all, the text of the First Amendment speaks of 
                                                                                                                 
 
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government.”). 
55 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  
56 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”). 
57 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the heart of the 
First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the 
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system 
and cultural life rest upon this ideal.”). See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) 
(“We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First 
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain 
from speaking at all.”). 
58 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) (“[T]he First . . . Amendment[] 
[has] never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or 
wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses.”); 
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49–51 (1961) (“At the outset we reject the view 
that freedom of speech and association as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
are ‘absolutes’ . . . . Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two 
ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited 
license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has been 
considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. On the other hand, general regulatory 
statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered 
exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade 
Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid 
governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a 
weighing of the governmental interest involved.” (footnote and internal citations omitted)).  
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“abridgment” and not an all-out prohibition of regulation.59 This 
inherently implies that the right to speak is limited in some way. 
Indeed, many of the Supreme Court’s decisions are an attempt at 
defining those limits. For instance, while the government “may not 
favor one speaker over another,”60 it may restrict access to its 
property for speech-related purposes in certain situations.61 The 
government may also place reasonable, content-neutral time, place, or 
manner restrictions on certain forms of expressive conduct, so long as 
the government leaves open ample alternative means of 
communication.62 Additionally, the government may proscribe speech 
that is likely to incite or induce “imminent lawless action.”63 And, 
there is that pesky little detail that “speech” must often be defined as 
such before it receives the requisite protections.64 
But these regulatory scenarios represent the exception, rather than 
the rule. Rarely will the government have a free hand to restrict 
speech as it pleases.65 In fact, the Supreme Court generally regards 
any law or regulation based upon the content of the particular 
                                                                                                                 
59 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”).  
60 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“In the 
realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over 
another.”).  
61 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799–800 (1985) 
(“Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to 
exercise their right to free speech on every type of government property without regard to the 
nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker’s activities.”).  
62 Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 535–36 (1980) (“This Court 
has recognized the validity of reasonable time, place, or manner regulations that serve a 
significant governmental interest and leave ample alternative channels for 
communication. . . . [T]he essence of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recognition 
that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, may frustrate legitimate 
governmental goals.”). 
63 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (“[T]he constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of 
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).  
64 In other words, the speech must be considered “speech.” See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (“Such statements must be taken in context, however, and are no 
more literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity ‘as not 
being speech at all.’ What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently with the First 
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, 
defamation, etc.)–not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so 
that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively 
proscribable content.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
65 See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000) (“Laws 
designed or intended to suppress or restrict the expression of specific speakers contradict basic 
First Amendment principles”); Barnes v. Glenn Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576 (1991) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“When any law restricts speech, even for a purpose that has nothing to do with 
the suppression of communication . . . we insist that it meet the high First-Amendment standard 
of justification.”).  
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message a speaker conveys as presumptively unconstitutional.66 And 
government discrimination based upon the speaker’s viewpoint is 
even more inherently suspect.67 In these cases of so-called viewpoint 
discrimination, courts apply strict scrutiny.68  
With these basic tenets of First Amendment jurisprudence as 
guideposts, the remainder of this Section analyzes the contours of free 
speech protection the Constitution affords public employees and 
elected officials. It argues that there are fundamental differences 
between elected officials and public employees that warrant higher 
protection of the former’s speech, even when they act within the 
ambit of their official duties. Furthermore, it argues that analogies to 
public-employee free speech cases, though providing a useful 
framework, should not be controlling, especially when the 
government attaches criminal violations to an elected official’s 
exercise of First Amendment freedoms. 
A. Public Employee Free Speech 
No Supreme Court case deals directly with the First Amendment 
rights of elected officials in the context of open meeting laws. 
Recently, however, elected officials have challenged restrictions of 
their First Amendment rights in several federal district courts.69 
Judges in these cases have generally looked to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos70 when determining the extent of 
                                                                                                                 
66 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) 
(“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”); 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (“Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”).  
67 See R.A.V., 515 U.S. at 829 (“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of 
content discrimination. The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific 
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the 
restriction.”).  
68 Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007) (“It is true enough that 
content-based regulations of speech are presumptively invalid. We have recognized . . . that the 
rationale of the general prohibition . . . is that content discrimination raises the specter that the 
Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
69 See, e.g., Hartman v. Register, No. 1:06-CV-33, 2007 WL 915193, at *7 (S.D. Ohio 
Mar. 26, 2007) (applying Garcetti to restrict Township Trustee’s First Amendment rights when 
acting pursuant to his official duties in opposing passage of the minutes); Hogan v. Twp. of 
Haddon, Civil No. 04-2036 (JBS), 2006 WL 3490353, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2006) (applying 
Garcetti to hold that elected Township Commissioner has no First Amendment rights when 
acting in her official capacity); Rangra v. Brown, No. P-05-CV-075, 2006 WL 3327634, at *5 
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2006), rev’d, 566 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2009), dismissed as moot en banc by 
584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009) (“For purposes of determining what constitutes protected speech 
under the First Amendment, there is no meaningful distinction among public employees, 
appointed public officials, and elected public officials.”).  
70 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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First Amendment protection to afford the speech of elected officials 
acting in their official capacity.71  
In Garcetti, Ceballos (a calendar deputy in the Los Angeles 
County District Attorney’s Office) prepared a disposition 
memorandum recommending that the District Attorney dismiss a 
pending case because of a faulty warrant.72 Ceballos’s supervisors 
decided to go ahead with the prosecution anyway, despite a “heated” 
discussion with Ceballos.73 Ceballos alleged that, as a result of his 
criticism of the office’s handling of the case, his supervisors subjected 
him to a series of retaliatory actions, including transfer to a position 
of lesser responsibility in a different jurisdiction and denial of a 
promotion.74 
The Supreme Court found that the First Amendment did not 
protect Ceballos’ memorandum. The Court held that when public 
officials speak during the performance of their official duties, their 
speech receives little—or, in most cases, no—First Amendment 
protection against employer discipline.75 Only when an employee 
speaks as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, does his 
speech falls under the ambit of the First Amendment.76 But even then 
the protection is more limited, and the government may still be able to 
impose discipline if: 1) “the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter 
of public concern,” and (if this answer is yes), 2) the interests of the 
government in regulating that employee’s speech justify the burdens 
placed on it.77 
Originally, the government’s ability to regulate an employee’s 
speech more readily than the speech of a private citizen stemmed 
from Justice Holmes’ proposition that “[t]he petitioner may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right 
to be a policeman.”78 This proposition—that government employees 
enjoyed absolutely no right to object when his employer placed 
                                                                                                                 
71 See cases cited supra note 69.  
72 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413–14. 
73 Id. at 414. 
74 Id. at 415.  
75 See id. at 421 (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and 
the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”) (emphasis 
added).  
76 See id. at 417 (“[T]he First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain 
circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.”). 
77 See id. at 418 (“[T]wo inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional protections 
accorded to public employee speech. The first requires determining whether the employee spoke 
as a citizen on a matter of public concern. [The second,] whether the relevant government entity 
had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the 
general public.”). 
78 McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.). 
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conditions on his employment—was the norm for nearly 100 years.79 
But it has since changed, and the Court now grounds the 
government’s ability to discipline an employee, whether acting within 
the scope of his employment or as a private citizen, in its interests as 
an employer.80 As such, when the government employee takes off his 
official-duty “hat,” and speaks in his capacity as private citizen, his 
speech is generally protected unless the government can advance a 
weighty enough interest to justify curtailing it. While his official-duty 
“hat” is on, however, the employee must abdicate his First 
Amendment rights in the name of efficiency and effectiveness.  
The government’s interest in regulating employee speech is rooted 
in the idea that, as an employer, it should be able to efficiently control 
the conduct of its employees and send consistent messages. When the 
right conditions are met, these interests are sometimes weighty 
enough to justify burdening the employee’s First Amendment rights.81 
Thus, so long as the government can show that the employee spoke 
pursuant to her official duties, the First Amendment affords no 
protection. And, even if the employee spoke “as a private citizen,” the 
government may still be able to discipline the employee if it advances 
a weighty enough interest.  
It therefore appears settled that the government can justify 
applying open meeting laws, like the Federal Sunshine Act, to 
agencies, commissions, universities and other non-elected public 
bodies under the rationale of Garcetti. Most open meeting acts limit 
the reach of the law to business that is before,82 or, in some more 
extreme cases, any business that may come before,83 the body. By 
                                                                                                                 
79 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“For most of this century, the 
unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to conditions placed 
upon the terms of employment—including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional 
rights.”). 
80 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as 
sovereign.”).  
81 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (“Government employers, like private employers, need a 
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be 
little chance for the efficient provision of public services.”); Waters, 511 U.S. at 675 (“[W]here 
the government is acting as employer, its efficiency concerns should . . . be assigned a greater 
value.”); cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) 
(“[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it 
is entitled to say what it wishes.”). 
82 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2009) (defining 
“meeting” as “any prearranged discussion of the public business of the public body by a 
majority of its members”). 
83 See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.001(4)(B) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (defining 
a “meeting” as a gathering conducted by a government body with a quorum present “at which 
the members receive information from, give information to, ask questions of, or receive 
questions from any third person . . . about the public business or public policy over which the 
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definition, then, the employee would be acting within the scope of his 
employment, and thus would fall under the first prong of Garcetti 
(employee speech pursuant to his official duty is not protected),84 and 
therefore would be subject to governmental discipline. But this does 
little to solve the problem of open meeting laws that impose criminal 
penalties; Garcetti says only that the speech is not protected from 
employer discipline.85  
B. The Test from Garcetti Is Not an Appropriate Tool  
to Analyze the Speech of Elected Officials 
There is a fundamental difference between the mode of regulation 
in cases like Garcetti (namely, employer disciplinary action)86 and the 
penalties attached to violations of an open meeting law. The former 
uses methods such as reprimand, reassignment, and, in extreme cases, 
termination, while the latter “regulates” through criminal prosecution, 
imposition of fines, and, in extreme cases, imprisonment.  
Another problem arises when courts attempt to apply the rule in 
Garcetti blindly to all public employees, regardless of their rank in 
the bureaucratic hierarchy and their unique and varied relationships 
with their employer. The issue lies in defining “public employee” in 
the context of the Garcetti analysis. While in most cases it will 
undoubtedly be clear, some courts have hesitated to apply Garcetti to 
higher-ranking government officials.87 And Garcetti itself does not 
draw a clear line. Although Ceballos exercised some supervisory 
authority, he still had non-elected officials supervising him.88 This 
ambiguity requires further parsing of the nebulous term “public 
employee,” especially when that employee is an elected official.  
                                                                                                                 
 
governmental body has supervision or control”).  
84 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
85 Id. See infra Part IV for a discussion of how the application of an open meeting law’s 
criminal penalties would change the analysis.  
86 See also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (holding that a public 
school teacher’s dismissal for making false statements was not justified without a showing that 
the statements were made recklessly or knowingly)). 
87 See Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr., Note, Government Employee, Are You a “Citizen”?: 
Garcetti v. Ceballos and the “Citizenship” Prong to the Pickering/Connick Protected Speech 
Test, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 589, 620–21 (2008) (discussing courts’ struggles to apply the Garcetti 
standard to employees who are neither regular state employees nor state officials). 
88 Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2004). It appears from the 
factual background that Ceballos had at least two non-elected officials supervising him: 
“Ceballos discussed the problems arising from this investigation with others in the Office, 
including his immediate supervisor, Carol Najera and the then-Head Deputy District Attorney, 
Frank Sundstedt.” Id. at 1171.  
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A closer inquiry reveals that elected officials are not covered by 
the Garcetti test because they are not “employees,” as the Court uses 
that term. Garcetti distinguishes speech uttered within the scope of 
employment from that spoken in the employee’s individual 
capacity.89 Whether an employee acts within the scope of his 
employment depends in large part upon the control his principal 
exerts over his actions.90 This right of control is lacking in the elected 
official—electorate relationship. While, elected officials serve set 
terms and are ultimately accountable to the electorate, “the people” 
have no direct mode of control over their representatives’ day-to-day 
actions. Citizens can, of course, write letters and lobby their city 
councilperson to vote one way or another on an issue, but there are no 
immediate repercussions if the councilperson chooses to ignore these 
overtures. 91 And often there are citizens lobbying him to vote the 
other way as well, so any sort of penalty for failing to listen to the 
recommendations of the electorate would put the legislator in an 
impossible Catch-22.  
One might argue that, despite the fact that the electorate cannot 
directly control their elected representatives, they can certainly 
influence their decisions through various mechanisms (donations, 
petitions, letters, rallies, etc.).92 This ability to influence, however, 
does not necessarily give rise to the right to control,93 and the absence 
of this right significantly alters the “employment” relationship of 
elected officials. This deviation is sufficient to remove elected 
officials from the purview of Garcetti.  
                                                                                                                 
89 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).  
90 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. F (2006) (“An essential 
element of agency is the principal’s right to control the agent’s actions. . . . A relationship of 
agency is not present unless the person on whose behalf action is taken has the right to control 
the actor.”); id. § 7.07(3)(a) (2006) (“[A]n employee is an agent whose principal controls or has 
the right to control the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work.”). 
91 At least, not the sort of repercussions seen in “public employee” cases like Garcetti and 
Waters.  
92 But see, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Critics of “Free Speech” and the Uses of the Past, 
12 CONST. COMMENT. 29, 31 (1995) (“One metaphor embraced by advocates of representative 
government is that of agency. . . . In the agency metaphor, the people are the principal, elected 
officials are the agents . . . .”). 
93 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). As the commentary makes clear:  
The principal’s right of control in an agency relationship is a narrower and 
more sharply defined concept than domination or influence more generally. Many 
positions and relationships give one person the ability to dominate or influence other 
persons but not the right to control their actions. . . . A relationship is one of agency 
only if the person susceptible to dominance or influence has consented to act on 
behalf of the other and the other has a right of control, not simply an ability to bring 
influence to bear. 
Id. cmt. f(1).  
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Additionally, limiting the free speech rights of elected officials 
would not serve the interests that allow the government to regulate 
employee speech in the first place: efficiently and effectively 
achieving its mission as an employer. When regulating the speech of 
public employees like Ceballos, the government has sufficient 
interests as an employer—promoting a consistent message, 
maintaining discipline, etc.—to justify the burden it places on the 
employee’s speech. These burdens are necessary to ensure that the 
agency or governmental entity runs smoothly.94  
This efficiency rationale simply does not apply in the case of 
elected officials. Elected officials do not have a direct supervisor, but 
rather, in many respects, elected officials are the individuals 
responsible for making the policies and shaping the consistent 
messages that the lower-level public employees must carry out. Our 
national system of government is predicated upon republican 
principles: the idea that the people have delegated their law-making 
responsibility to a select few.95 Treating these select few as if they 
were identical to all other public employees would severely restrict 
their ability to govern and, in the process, undermine the conscious 
choice we, as a people, made to found a republican form of 
government.  
Ideally, our representatives should be able to detach themselves 
and step away from their private interests—even their self-interest in 
reelection—when discussing and deliberating the merits of a 
proposition.96 While in today’s partisan political atmosphere this may 
seem slightly naïve, the Founders thought that the electorate should 
only support the wisest and most virtuous candidates; those capable 
of rising above the pressures of their private lives to determine what 
                                                                                                                 
94 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“The key to First 
Amendment analysis of government employment decisions, then, is this: The government’s 
interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a 
relatively subordinate interest when it acts as a sovereign to a significant one when it acts as 
employer. . . . [W]here the government is acting as employer, its efficiency concerns 
should . . . be assigned a greater value.”). 
95 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 56 (Alexander Hamilton) (George Stade ed., 2006) (“The 
two great points of difference, between a democracy and a republic, are, first, the delegation of 
the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest. . . . The effect 
of . . . [this] difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing 
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true 
interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice 
it to temporary or partial considerations.”).  
96 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539, 1547–48 
(1988) (arguing that, in a republic, “political participants [are] to subordinate their private 
interests to the public good through political participation in an ongoing process of collective 
self-determination”).  
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is in the best interest of the common good.97 They thought that the 
ability to deliberate freely and without restraint was vital to 
uncovering the common good, especially in times where popular 
passions counseled an expedient course of action.98  
Modern commentators (some part of the “Republican Revival”) 
have indicated that it may not be in the public’s best interest for these 
deliberations in search of the public good to be aired openly.99 Rather, 
the deliberative process itself enables elected officials to step back 
from their personal interests and “achieve a measure of critical 
distance from prevailing desires and practices,” thereby allowing 
them to subject these desires and practices to an unbiased review and 
debate.100 Such a mechanism serves to “insulate political actors from 
private pressure” and prevent attempts to undermine the deliberative 
process.101 While strict record keeping, disclosure requirements, open 
meetings, and public information statutes might allow for better 
monitoring of the deliberative process, these measures come with 
added costs.102 For instance, some of these requirements may unduly 
burden deliberative bodies; others are cumbersome to enforce.103  
                                                                                                                 
97 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 316 (James Madison) (George Stade ed., 2006) (“The 
aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess 
most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society; and in the 
next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they 
continue to hold their public trust.”).  
98 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (George Stade ed., 2006) 
(“When occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the people are at variance with 
their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed, to be the guardians of 
those interests; to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity 
for more cool and sedated reflection.”); Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1548–49 (“[D]eliberation 
counsels political actors to achieve a measure of critical distance from prevailing desires and 
practices, subjecting these desires and practices to scrutiny and review.”).  
99 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 
889 (1986). Professor Sunstein argues, “[I]f decisionmaking processes were exposed to public 
view, disagreements and controversial views might not be aired at all. Similarly, a group is 
unlikely to develop a coherent position if it is unable to explore, with some tentativeness, the 
disparate options with which it is confronted. . . . If deliberations are disclosed while they are in 
progress, organized groups with intense preferences may attempt to influence the outcome.” Id. 
at 895–96.  
100 Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1548–49.  
101 Id. at 1549. Professor Sunstein notes that: “The requirement of deliberation is not 
purely formal. . . . [D]eliberative processes are often undermined by intimidation, strategic and 
manipulative behavior, collective action problems, adaptive preferences, or—most generally—
disparities in political influence.” Id. at 1549–50.  
102 Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 1627, 1664–65 (1999). 
103 See id. (“As a general matter, such requirements might unduly burden these entities, and 
such sunshine requirements would be awkward to enforce . . . .”). Issacharoff and Ortiz 
continue: “Indeed, a significant branch of First Amendment law was forged in an effort to 
protect the autonomy and privacy of dissident groups.” Id. at 1665. 
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Thus it is clear that our republican form of government requires 
that we allow the elected officials therein some breathing room.104 
The citizenry cannot afford to constantly hover behind their elected 
officials, peering eagerly over their shoulders at every turn. If this 
were truly what our Founders intended, they could have chosen to be 
governed by a direct democracy. But they did not. And therefore, the 
people cannot expect to instruct their elected representatives as if they 
were ordinary “employees,” serving at the beck-and-call of their 
“employer.” As such, a degree of separation is not only appropriate, 
but necessary to the maintenance of our form of republican 
government. 
In fact, the Founders debated whether the citizenry should have 
this very right: a right to instruct their representatives. But, as the 
British Statesman Edmund Burke pointed out: “Your representative 
owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, 
instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”105 The First 
Congress seemed to share Burke’s sentiment as it debated this 
proposed addition to the First Amendment, which would have given 
citizens the right “to instruct their representatives.”106  
During the spirited debate that ensued, Representative Thomas 
Hartley argued that “the principle of representation is distinct from an 
agency,” and that “the people ought to have confidence in the honor 
and integrity of those they send forward to transact their business.”107 
He noted specifically that during the times when the People’s 
passions were inflamed and their mood intransigent, binding 
instructions would be particularly problematic and antithetical to the 
core purposes of representation. Rather, he felt that insulating 
representatives from being bound by such reactionary opinions was a 
virtue, one necessary for the Union’s existence.108 
Representatives George Clymer and Roger Sherman also decried 
the proposed addition. Rep. Clymer put his opposition in no uncertain 
terms:  
                                                                                                                 
104 Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“First Amendment freedoms need 
breathing space to survive . . . .”).  
105 BURKE, supra note 1, at 10.  
106 1 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS 138 (Thomas Hart Benton ed., 1857). 
107 Id.  
108 Id. Hartley specifically said:  
When the passions of the people are excited, instructions have been resorted 
to and obtained, to answer party purposes; and although the public opinion is 
generally respectable, yet at such moments it has been known to be often wrong; and 
happy is that Government composed of men of firmness and wisdom to discover, 
and resist popular error. 
Id.  
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This is a most dangerous principle, utterly destructive of all 
sides of an independent and deliberative body, which are 
essential requisites in the Legislatures of free Governments; 
they prevent men of abilities and experience from rendering 
those services to the community that are in their power, 
destroying the object contemplated by establishing an 
efficient General Government and rendering Congress a mere 
passive machine.109 
Rep. Sherman thought that such an addition would defeat the 
purpose of having a deliberative body in the first place.  
I think, when the people have chosen a representative, it is his 
duty to meet others from the different parts of the Union, and 
consult, and agree with them to such acts as are for the 
general benefit of the whole community. If they were to be 
guided by instructions, there would be no use in 
deliberation . . . .110  
Sherman also thought such a right unnecessary because a 
representative had a duty to discover and act in the best interests of 
the general welfare. If his instructions were on point, they would be 
redundant. If they were to the contrary, he must, by virtue of his 
position, “be bound by every principle of justice to disregard 
them.”111  
James Madison (at the time, a Representative from Virginia) also 
participated in the debate. Madison felt that, because the First 
Amendment already included the freedoms of speech and petition, a 
“right to instruct,” if it was not binding, would simply be 
superfluous.112 If, however, the People could issue binding 
instructions to their legislators, then Madison felt this was a 
“dangerous” proposition; and one to be avoided.113 In the end, the 
                                                                                                                 
109 Id. at 139.  
110 Id. 
111 Id. Sherman said:  
It is the duty of a good representative to inquire what measures are most likely 
to promote the general welfare, and, after he has discovered them, to give them his 
support. Should his instructions, therefore, coincide with his ideas on any measure, 
they would be unnecessary ; if they were contrary to the conviction of his own mind, 
he must be bound by every principle of justice to disregard them. 
Id.  
112 Id. at 141 (“The right of freedom of speech is secured ; the liberty of the press is 
expressly declared to be beyond the reach of this Government ; the people may therefore 
publicly address their representatives, may privately advise them, or declare their sentiments by 
petition to the whole body ; in all these ways they may communicate their will.”). 
113 Id. Madison said:  
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proposed “right to instruct” failed, with ten votes in favor and forty-
one against.114 
Thus, it appears that elected officials have an inherently different 
relationship with their “employer” than other public employees. As 
such, the test from Garcetti is not an appropriate mechanism to 
analyze their free speech rights. Subjecting our elected 
representatives, who act in essence as trustees for the general good, to 
an analysis more aptly suited for determining the rights of agents, 
severely undercuts their legislative autonomy and the republican 
principles upon which our government was founded. It is therefore 
inappropriate for courts to wield Garcetti like a hatchet to cut off the 
hand when only the pinky need be amputated.  
C. Elected Official’s Free Speech Rights 
The Supreme Court has yet to address the free speech rights of 
elected officials in the wake of Garcetti—and it has never squarely 
addressed the extent of their free speech protection when they are 
performing their official duties. The intent of the Framers, however, 
in specifically including the Speech or Debate Clause in the 
Constitution (before they adopted the First Amendment, mind you) 
may shed some light on how they viewed the free speech rights of 
elected officials. Additionally, the jurisprudential landscape is not 
completely barren regarding the free speech rights of politicians, and 
there are several decisions that help guide our way.  
1. Interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause 
The Speech or Debate Clause provides: “[F]or any Speech or 
Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be 
questioned in any other Place.”115 James Wilson (a drafter of the 
clause and one of George Washington’s six original appointments to 
the Supreme Court)116 felt that the Speech or Debate Clause was an 
indispensible component of the Constitution because it “enable[d] and 
                                                                                                                 
 
My idea of the sovereignty of the people is, that the people can change the 
constitution if they please; but while the constitution exists, they must conform 
themselves to its dictates. But I do not believe that the inhabitants of any district can 
speak the voice of the people; so far from it, their ideas may contradict the sense of 
the whole people; hence the consequence that instructions are binding on the 
representative is of a doubtful, if not of a dangerous nature.  
Id. 
114 See id. at 144.  
115 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.  
116 COMM’N ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: ITS BEGINNINGS AND ITS JUSTICES 1790–1991 60 (1992).  
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encourage[d] a representative of the publick [sic] to discharge his 
publick [sic] trust.”117 Wilson felt that representatives should “enjoy 
the fullest liberty of speech, and that [they] should be protected from 
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise 
of that liberty may occasion offence [sic].”118  
The Supreme Court, however, did not construe the Clause until 
1880 in Kilbourn v. Thompson.119 There, the Court noted that the 
speech or debate privilege derived from the English Parliament and 
that soon after its adoption in that body, it had become “indispensible 
and universally acknowledged.”120 The Kilbourn Court then quoted 
favorably from Chief Justice Parsons’ opinion in Coffin v. Coffin,121 
which gave the Clause a liberal interpretation.122 The Court even went 
so far as to extend the privilege beyond mere words spoken in the 
House or Senate to written reports, resolutions, votes, and other things 
“generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in 
relation to the business before it.”123 
In more recent times, the Supreme Court has upheld this broad 
reading because the privilege ensures legislative independence.124 The 
legislative history shows that the Framers intended the Clause to act 
                                                                                                                 
117 JAMES WILSON, Of the Constitution of the United States and of Pennsylvania—of the 
Legislative Department, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 
1967), quoted in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951).  
118 Id. 
119 103 U.S. 168 (1880).  
120 Id. at 202 (quoting Stockdale v. Hansard, (1839) 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (Q.B.) 1156). 
Lord Denman elaborated in Stockdale:  
The privilege of having their debates unquestioned, though denied when the 
members began to speak their minds freely . . . was soon clearly perceived to be 
indispensable and universally acknowledged. By consequence, whatever is done 
within the walls of either assembly must pass without question in any other place. 
For speeches made in Parliament by a member to the prejudice of any other person, 
or hazardous to the public peace, that member enjoys complete impunity. 
Stockdale, 112 Eng. Rep. at 1156, quoted in Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 202. 
121 4 Mass. 1 (1808). 
122 Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 203 (“These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of 
protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the rights of 
the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office. . . . I, 
therefore, think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full 
design of it may be answered.” (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808))). 
123 Id. at 204. The Court went on:  
It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it to words 
spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written 
reports presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, 
though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, whether it 
is done vocally or by passing between the tellers. 
Id.  
124 See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966) (“The legislative privilege, 
protecting against possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile 
judiciary, is one manifestation of the ‘practical security’ for ensuring the independence of the 
legislature.”).  
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as a shield for legislators against abusive encroachments by the other 
branches.125 Additionally, in United States v. Brewster,126 the 
Supreme Court said: “[T]he purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause 
is to protect the individual legislator, not simply for his own sake, but 
to preserve the independence and thereby the integrity of the 
legislative process.”127  
Thus, there appear to be two overriding motivations for the Speech 
or Debate Clause. First, the Framers placed a high value on 
legislators’ ability to debate freely. This includes, presumably, 
freedom not only from prosecution, but also from other extraneous 
influences that would have a similar chilling effect on their ability to 
openly debate the merits of a proposition without fear of retaliation or 
suppression. Second, the drafters intended that the Clause serve as an 
additional buffer protecting the legislative branch in the event of an 
overreaching executive or a hostile judiciary.  
Though only tangentially related to the broader notion of free 
speech, these considerations help to focus our analysis of elected 
officials’ free speech rights. In choosing to exempt congressional 
speech or debate from question “in any other place,” the Framers 
recognized not only the right of legislators to speak, but also the right 
of the legislative branch, as a whole, to be free of encroachment from 
the other branches.  
2. The Extent of Elected Officials’ First Amendment Rights 
The proposition that the free speech rights of elected officials are 
more limited than those of ordinary citizens seems (at first blush, at 
least) rather counterintuitive. Nonetheless, this is what several courts 
have held.128 Garcetti has invited an increase in these rulings, with 
several federal district courts applying that rationale and finding that 
elected politicians acting in their official capacity receive no First 
                                                                                                                 
125 Id. at 180–81 (“[I]t is apparent from the history of the clause that the privilege was not 
born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits such as those in Kilbourn and Tenney, but rather 
to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.”).  
126 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
127 Id. at 524 (emphasis added).  
128 See, e.g., Cole v. State, 673 P.2d 345, 350 (Colo. 1984) (“We conclude that the Open 
Meetings Law strikes the proper balance between the public's right of access to information and 
a legislator's right to freedom of speech. The people have determined that they are willing to 
assume the detriment of a potential stifling of discussion among legislators to secure the 
advantages of open government.”); Kansas ex rel. Murray v. Palmgren, 646 P.2d 1091, 1099 
(Kan. 1982) (“The First Amendment does indeed protect private discussions of governmental 
affairs among citizens. Everything changes, however, when a person is elected to public 
office. . . . Elected officials have no constitutional right to conduct governmental affairs behind 
closed doors.”).  
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Amendment protections.129 But the Supreme Court of the United 
States has not endorsed this application.130 In fact, such an application 
appears to go against a seemingly clear line of precedent that 
emanates from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wood v. Georgia131 
and Bond v. Floyd,132 both of which intimate that elected officials 
receive full First Amendment protections even when they act in their 
official capacities.133 
In Wood, a county sheriff was indicted for contempt of court 
because he made public statements criticizing local court proceedings 
related to redistricting. The indictment specified that the sheriff made 
the statement in his capacity as a citizen and not in his official 
capacity as sheriff.134 Nevertheless, Georgia argued that because 
Wood was a sheriff, “his right to freedom of expression must be more 
severely curtailed than that of an average citizen.”135 The Court 
explicitly rejected this argument,136 stating that even if Wood spoke in 
                                                                                                                 
129 See, e.g., Hartman v. Register, No. 1:06-CV-33, 2007 WL 915193, at *6 (S.D. Ohio 
Mar. 26, 2007) (“Garcetti . . . makes clear that speech made pursuant to an individual's official 
duties is not protected by the First Amendment. The distinction between the public employee in 
Garcetti and an elected official, in this case, Plaintiff, is inconsequential.”); Hogan v. Twp. of 
Haddon, No. 04-2036 (JBS), 2006 WL 3490353, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2006) (elected township 
commissioner protested the withholding of an article she authored and submitted for publication 
to the town newspaper, but “because her submissions were made in her capacity as a Township 
commissioner (and not a private citizen), [she] has no First Amendment rights . . . .”); Rangra v. 
Brown, No. P-05-CV-075, 2006 WL 3327634, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2006), rev’d, 566 F.3d 
515 (5th Cir. 2009), dismissed as moot en banc by 584 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Because the 
speech at issue is uttered entirely in the speaker’s capacity as [an elected] member of a 
collective decision-making body, and thus is the kind of communication in which he or she is 
required to engage as part of his or her official duties, it is not protected by the First 
Amendment . . . .”). 
130 Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 991 (7th Cir. 2010) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (noting 
that, with reference to the Pickering–Garcetti line of cases, “[n]either this court nor the 
Supreme Court . . . has ever held that these decisions limiting the speech of public employees 
can be applied to elected officials’ speech”).  
131 370 U.S. 375 (1962).  
132 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
133 See also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781–82 (2002) (“The role 
that elected officials play in our society makes it all the more imperative that they be allowed 
freely to express themselves on matters of current public importance.” (quoting Wood, 370 U.S. 
at 395)); X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 69 (2d Cir. 1999) (“One does not lose one’s 
right to speak upon becoming a legislator.”); Miller v. Town of Hull, 878 F.2d 523, 532 (1st Cir. 
1989) (“[W]e have no difficulty finding that the act of voting on public issues by a member of a 
public agency or board comes within the freedom of speech guarantee of the first amendment. 
This is especially true when the agency members are elected officials.”); Wrzeski v. City of 
Madison, 558 F. Supp. 664, 667 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (“Plaintiff’s status as a legislator does not 
strip her of any rights she would otherwise enjoy under the First Amendment to speak freely or 
not to speak at all. . . . Courts have repeatedly analyzed freedom of speech cases in the 
legislative context without the use of any special First Amendment standard.”).  
134 Wood, 370 U.S. at 380–81. 
135 Id. at 393.  
136 Id. (“Under the circumstances of this case, this argument must be rejected.”).  
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his capacity as sheriff, that fact provided no basis for curtailing his 
right to free speech.137  
The petitioner was an elected official and had the right to 
enter the field of political controversy, particularly where his 
political life was at stake. The role that elected officials play 
in our society makes it all the more imperative that they be 
allowed freely to express themselves on matters of current 
public importance.138 
The Court elaborated on the extent of elected officials’ First 
Amendment protection in Bond v. Floyd.139 In that case, Bond, a 
newly elected member of the Georgia House of Representatives, filed 
suit after the Clerk of the House refused to administer his oath of 
office. The Clerk demanded that Bond retract certain statements—
made after he was elected, but before he took office—opposing the 
Vietnam War. He reasoned that Bond could not, in good faith, take 
the oath of office because his statements opposing the war gave aid 
and comfort to the enemy, and were thus in conflict with the Georgia 
Constitution.140 Georgia specifically argued that the court must hold 
an elected legislator to a higher standard than a private citizen for the 
purpose of analyzing his First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court 
disagreed.141 The Court again reasoned that elected representatives 
should have wide latitude to express their views so that their 
constituents can properly judge their actions.142  
Georgia then attempted to argue that the Court should not extend 
the principle that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open,”143 to cases involving legislators because the 
policy of free debate on public issues applies only to the citizen-
critic.144 The Court also dismissed this argument: “The interest of the 
public in hearing all sides of a public issue is hardly advanced by 
                                                                                                                 
137 Id. at 394 (“However, assuming that the Court of Appeals did consider to be significant 
the fact that petitioner was a sheriff, we do not believe this fact provides any basis for curtailing 
his right of free speech.”).  
138 Id. at 394–95 (footnote and citation omitted).  
139 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
140 Id. at 123–27.  
141 Id. at 132–33 (“The State declines to argue that Bond’s statements would violate any 
law if made by a private citizen, but it does argue that even though such a citizen might be 
protected by his First Amendment rights, the State may nonetheless apply a stricter standard to 
its legislators. We do not agree.”).  
142 Id. at 135–36 (“The manifest function of the First Amendment in a representative 
government requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues 
of policy.”).  
143 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
144 Bond, 385 U.S. at 136.  
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extending more protection to citizen-critics than to legislators.”145 The 
Court reasoned that not only do legislators have a responsibility to 
their constituents to take a position on controversial matters, but also 
the electorate is also entitled to “be represented in governmental 
debates by the person they have elected to represent them.”146 
Taken together, Bond and Wood strongly support the idea that 
elected officials enjoy the same protection under the Free Speech 
Clause as private citizens—and they perhaps enjoy even greater 
latitude.147 But, though the decision in Wood seems explicit, the Court 
did not have a clear enough factual record to determine whether 
Wood issued his statements in his capacity as sheriff or as a private 
citizen.148 Nonetheless, lower courts have interpreted these decisions 
as holding that elected officials have very few restraints on their First 
Amendment freedoms.149  
For example, in Wrzeski v. City of Madison,150 a city 
councilwoman challenged an ordinance requiring council members to 
vote either “aye” or “nay” on every question put before the council 
(in other words, no council member could abstain from voting). The 
ordinance authorized the council president to censure any member 
who refused to vote and, if that same member refused to vote on a 
                                                                                                                 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 136–37.  
147 See William V. Luneburg, Civic Republicanism, the First Amendment, and Executive 
Branch Policymaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 378 (1991) (“[A]pplication of the First 
Amendment to representatives acting in their official capacities as in Bond is entirely consistent 
with Professor Sunstein’s view of that provision as a structural guarantee whose purpose 
extends beyond private autonomy to the protection of the republican-envisioned deliberative 
process . . . .”).  
148 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 393 (1962) (“[T]here was no finding by the trial court 
that the petitioner issued the statements in his capacity as sheriff . . . .”). 
149 See, e.g., Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 101 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Bond . . . established nearly 
forty years ago that the exclusion of an officeholder from her office in retaliation for her 
political views is a violation of the First Amendment.”); Camacho v. Brandon, 317 F.3d 153, 
166 (2d Cir. 2003) (Walker, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he Court recognized in Bond v. Floyd that 
representative democracy requires that we provide legislators broad freedom of speech.”); 
DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000) (“While the free speech rights 
of elected officials may well be entitled to broader protection than those of public employees 
generally, the underlying rationale remains the same. Legislators are given the widest latitude to 
express their views on issues of policy.”) (internal quotations omitted); Gewertz v. Jackman, 
467 F. Supp. 1047, 1058 (D.N.J. 1979) (“Bond squarely holds that legislators enjoy the same 
degree of first amendment protection as private citizens.”). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have 
also determined that legislators enjoy First Amendment rights, but neither relied explicitly on 
Bond or Wood. See Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 506 (5th Cir. 1999) (“There is no 
question that political expression such as [Councilwoman] Colson's positions and votes on City 
matters is protected speech under the First Amendment.”); O’Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 873 
F.2d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 1989) (“A city council is not free to retaliate against a member of the 
council because of such member's exercise of first amendment rights.”). 
150 558 F. Supp. 664 (W.D. Wis. 1983).  
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subsequent issue, to order a civil forfeiture of $100.151 The court, 
citing Police Department v. Mosley,152 analyzed the ordinance as a 
content-based restriction because “[l]egislators enjoy the same First 
Amendment protections as any other members of our society.”153 
Before enjoining enforcement of the ordinance, the court noted, “a 
representative who consistently dodges difficult or controversial 
issues by not voting on them does a disservice to his or her 
constituency. However, in our government system, the proper remedy 
for such behavior lies with the electorate.”154 
The district court in Wrzeski also stated that it might, at first blush, 
seem “incongruous” to analyze a legislator’s speech under the First 
Amendment.155 But the fact that the speech emanated from an elected 
member of the legislative branch is of no moment in terms of the First 
Amendment standard applied. According to the court, the difference 
lies not in the standard of First Amendment review, but rather the 
weight accorded to the government’s interest.156 Therefore, the court 
undertook to weigh the interest advanced by the council against the 
content-based regulation of the ordinance. In applying this 
“compelling government interest test,” the district court found that 
requiring councilpersons to vote on every matter did not “tend[] to 
further the effective operation of the . . . Council.”157 Thus, according 
to the district court in Wrzeski, the proper place to account for the 
legislator’s status is in the evaluation of the government’s advanced 
interest, rather than a blanket, categorical denial of First Amendment 
rights.  
Similarly, in Miller v. Town of Hull,158 the First Circuit held that 
the Town Selectmen could not suspend the elected commissioners of 
the Housing Redevelopment Authority for refusing to vote in 
accordance with the Selectmen’s wishes. The court noted: “Although 
we have found no cases directly on point, probably because it is 
considered unassailable, we have no difficulty finding that the act of 
voting on public issues . . . comes within the freedom of speech 
guarantee of the first amendment.”159 After citing to Bond, the court 
                                                                                                                 
151 Id. at 665–66.  
152 408 U.S. 92 (1972).  
153 Wrzeski, 558 F. Supp. at 667 (citing Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132–33 (1966)).  
154 Id. at 668.  
155 Id. at 666.  
156 See id. at 667–68 (“[T]he council’s need to structure its proceedings in an orderly 
fashion is an appropriate consideration in applying the ‘compelling government interest’ test to 
the facts of this case.”).  
157 Id. at 668. 
158 878 F.2d 523 (1st Cir. 1989).  
159 Id. at 532 (emphasis added). 
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continued: “The right to vote freely . . . derives from the first 
amendment, which protects the official statements of legislators.”160  
The Town attempted to argue that the suspensions were legitimate 
disciplinary actions under one of two theories: political patronage161 
and regulation of government employee speech.162 The First Circuit 
conceded that “public officials in politically relevant positions may 
sometimes be properly removed from office because of their political 
affiliation, and because of the political views they express, without 
running afoul of the First Amendment,” and that “discharging a 
government employee” could be appropriate if his speech hampered 
the effective operation of the governmental body.163 But the court 
quickly dismissed each of these scenarios as “remote from the one 
presented in this case.”164 The court refused to treat the elected 
commissioners as “government employees,” presumably because they 
were not. Instead, the court reasoned that, as elected officials, they 
had “an obligation to take positions on controversial political 
questions so that their constituents [could] be fully informed by them, 
and be better able to assess their qualifications.”165  
Finally, the Supreme Court has recently intimated that candidates 
for office enjoy the full and robust protections of the First 
Amendment. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,166 the Court 
evaluated the “announce clause” of the Minnesota Rules of 
Professional Conduct. The clause said, “a candidate for judicial office 
shall not announce his or her views on disputed legal or political 
issues.”167 This prohibition extended to even “a mere statement of [a 
candidate’s] current position, even if he [did] not bind himself to 
maintain that position after election.”168 While the announce clause 
purports to prohibit candidates for judicial office from discussing the 
subject of politics, the Court held that it was an impermissible 
content-based ban that “burden[ed] a category of speech . . . at the 
core of our First Amendment freedoms—speech about the 
                                                                                                                 
160 Id. at 533 (citing Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) and Clarke v. United States, 705 
F. Supp 605 (D.D.C. 1988)).  
161 Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976) (plurality opinion) (patronage dismissals 
may be appropriate to ensure political loyalty among policy-making officials).  
162 Cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983) (disciplining a public employee for 
speech on matters of purely personal concern or for speech disrupting the orderly functioning of 
the governmental entity does not necessarily violate the First Amendment). 
163 Miller, 878 F.2d at 532 n.13 (emphasis added).  
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 532 (quoting Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136–37 (1966)).  
166 536 U.S. 765 (2002).  
167 Id. at 770 (internal quotation omitted).  
168 Id.  
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qualifications of candidates for public office.”169 White therefore 
supports the proposition that elected officials receive the same First 
Amendment protections as private citizens.  
These federal precedents, along with the Speech and Debate 
Clause, demonstrate that elected officials are inherently different from 
government “employees.” Classifying them as mere agents grossly 
undervalues the role they play in our society. In actuality, they are 
more akin to stewards or trustees of the public welfare, rather than 
blind executors of the electorate’s whims. The Speech or Debate 
Clause suggests that legislators may be worthy of greater free speech 
protections than private citizens, especially when they are carrying 
out their legislative duties. This serves not only to protect the 
individual legislators right to free expression, but the legislative 
branch, as a whole, from encroachment by the other branches.  
The Supreme Court of Nevada recently recognized this distinction 
in Carrigan v. Commission on Ethics.170 In that case, a city council 
member challenged a written censure he received from the Nevada 
Ethics Commission for failing to abstain from voting on a measure in 
which he had a potential conflict of interest. The district court 
concluded that, because voting on a matter before the council was an 
official act, the Pickering–Garcetti line of cases applied.171 The 
Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed, noting: “[w]hile Carrigan is 
employed by the government, he is an elected public officer, and his 
relationship with his ‘employer,’ the people, differs from that of other 
state employees. Therefore, the district court erred in applying the 
Pickering balancing test.”172 The court then proceeded to apply strict 
scrutiny.173 
In Carrigan, Justice Pickering (ironically enough) issued a lone 
dissent. He argued that the majority’s distinguishment of Carrigan’s 
employment relationship was “overly simplistic,” because it “does not 
take into account the Legislature’s control over local 
governments . . . and the constitutional and policy-based imperative 
of non-self-interested governmental decisionmakers.”174 Thus, he 
                                                                                                                 
169 Id. at 774 (internal quotation omitted). While the Court did not explicitly acknowledge 
the subject-matter-based nature of the ban, it did note the following: “There is an obvious 
tension between the article of Minnesota’s popularly approved Constitution which provides that 
judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s announce clause which places most 
subjects of interest to the voters off limits.” Id. at 787 (emphasis added). 
170 236 P.3d 616 (Nev. 2010).  
171 Id. at 619 (“The Commission and the Legislature (as amicus) assert that the district 
court properly concluded that the statute should be reviewed under a less strict standard as 
outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Pickering.”).  
172 Id. at 622.  
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 626 (Pickering, J., dissenting).  
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would have, like the district court, applied the Pickering balancing 
test.  
But arguments of this type represent a misunderstanding of strict 
scrutiny. This higher level of inquiry does not ignore interests (which 
are often weighty) in maintaining impartiality and preventing 
corruption and impropriety. Rather, strict scrutiny simply strips away 
the presumption of validity that normally attaches to a legislative 
enactment and shifts the burden of proof to the government.175 The 
solution is not to apply Pickering/Garcetti’s lower level of review, 
but rather to accord the government’s stated interests the proper 
weight.176  
This is what the Supreme Court of the United States did in White. 
There, the Court did not distinguish between the First Amendment 
rights of elected judges and the First Amendment freedoms of private 
citizens.177 Rather, it adhered to the principle expressed in Wood: 
“[t]he role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the 
more imperative that they be allowed freely to express themselves on 
matters of current public importance.”178 This realization becomes 
even more powerful when put into the context of the time: Wood and 
Bond, which noted the unqualified First Amendment freedoms of 
legislators, were decided several years before cases like Pickering v. 
Board of Education179 and Keyishian v. Board of Regents,180 which 
                                                                                                                 
175 Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 
48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 359–60 (2006) (“Strict scrutiny varies from ordinary scrutiny by 
imposing three hurdles on the government. It shifts the burden of proof to the government; 
requires the government to pursue a ‘compelling state interest;’ and demands that the regulation 
promoting the compelling interest be ‘narrowly tailored.’”) (internal quotations and footnotes 
omitted). 
176 Cf. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 993 (7th Cir. 2010) (Rovner, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he solution is to apply strict scrutiny but give proper weight to the exceedingly compelling 
interest the state has in ensuring an impartial and fair judiciary.”).  
177 Even the dissenting Justices in White each defended the cannon under the assumption 
that strict scrutiny was the proper standard of review. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 
536 U.S. 765, 800 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Minnesota has a compelling interest in 
sanctioning such statements.”); id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In addition to protecting 
litigants’ due process rights, the parties in this case further agree, the pledges or promises clause 
advances another compelling state interest: preserving the public’s confidence in the integrity 
and impartiality of its judiciary.”). See also Siefert, 608 F.3d at 992 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“In 
White, it was undisputed and uncontroversial that the court should apply strict scrutiny in 
evaluating the content-based restrictions on the canons of judicial conduct.”).  
178 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962).  
179 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that a school board could not fire a teacher for writing a 
newspaper editorial critical of a recent board decision). The Court went on to explain that:  
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be read to suggest 
that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment 
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public 
interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it 
proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior 
decisions of this Court. 
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soundly rejected the notion that one must give up his constitutional 
freedoms upon taking public employment. Thus, it seems legislators 
and elected officials had greater liberty to express themselves than 
other public “employees” well before cases like Garcetti and there 
appears to be little reason to doubt that their expressive freedoms 
should be, in any way, limited by it. This further compels the 
conclusion that elected representatives, even when acting in their 
official capacity, should enjoy First Amendment protections equal to 
private citizens.  
III. OPEN MEETING LAWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The First Amendment protects elected officials’ expression to the 
same extent that it protects a private citizen’s expression. “The 
protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.”181 Efficient and effective function of 
government may logically enable limiting the free-speech rights of 
public employees while they are acting within the scope of their 
employment. They are, after all, implementing the already expressed 
“will of the people.” But it makes little sense to similarly limit elected 
representatives’ speech; for they are charged with gauging, devising, 
and enacting those political and social changes. As such, our elected 
representatives should be given the broadest latitude in the exercise of 
their First Amendment rights.182 
But discerning that elected officials have free speech protection 
akin to private citizens hardly disposes of the matter. Rather, it 
confirms that we must delve deeper into the murky bog of First 
Amendment jurisprudence in search of answers to our open meeting 
law problems.  
                                                                                                                 
 
Id. at 568.  
180 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967) (“[T]he theory that public employment which may be 
denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been 
uniformly rejected.” (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1965).  
181 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).  
182 See supra notes 137, 141 and accompanying text. Cf. supra note 122 and accompanying 
text.  
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A. Determining the Burden on Elected Officials’ Speech 
1. Content-Neutral and Content-Based Restrictions 
Most governmental burdens on speech are either content-neutral or 
content-based restrictions.183 Content-neutral restrictions “limit 
expression without regard to the content or communicative impact of 
the message conveyed.”184 Content-based restrictions, on the other 
hand, “limit the communication because of the message conveyed.”185 
Since content-neutral regulations generally receive much more 
deference than content-based ones,186 this question of content has 
become central to modern First Amendment jurisprudence.187 
When evaluating content-neutral restrictions, for instance, the 
Supreme Court is generally concerned that the restrictions undercut 
individuals’ ability to communicate their views to others.188 By 
reducing the avenues available to communicate, the government 
essentially reduces the total amount of discussion. This, in turn, 
impedes other core First Amendment values, such as the search for 
truth.189 Since laws differ in the number of avenues they restrict, the 
Supreme Court tests most content-neutral restrictions by balancing 
the government’s interest with the intrusiveness of the restriction, 
and, in doing so, the Court attempts to ensure that no less-intrusive 
means could achieve the government’s objective.190  
On the other hand, the Supreme Court treats content-based 
restrictions quite differently. First, the Court generally determines 
                                                                                                                 
183 See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 
(1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions]; Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of 
Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 81 (1978) [hereinafter Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions]. 
184 Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 182, at 48.  
185 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 189, 190 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation]. 
186 See generally id.  
187 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of 
Speech: Problems in The Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 49 (2000) 
(“[I]ncreasingly in free speech law, the central inquiry is whether government action is content 
based or content neutral.”); Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws that Are 
Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 
801, 804 (2004) (“The distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws has played a 
crucial role in determining the standards of review that are used to measure the constitutionality 
of laws that affect freedom of expression.”); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-
Based/Content-Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 
596 (2003) (“The distinction between content-based and content neutral government actions is 
fundamental to free speech doctrine.”).  
188 Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 184, at 192–93.  
189 Id. at 193.  
190 Id. at 192.  
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whether the speech is of low or high value. Low-value speech 
(fighting words, child pornography, express incitement, etc.), 
generally receives only limited protection. As such, the Court tends to 
simply balance the contribution of this low-value speech with 
competing government interests and the risk that the law will 
inadvertently chill high-value speech.191 High-value speech, though, 
tends to receive far greater protection. The Court will often employ 
some form of a “clear and present danger” or “compelling 
government interest” test. Consequently, the Supreme Court has 
invalidated almost every content-based regulation of high-value 
speech.192  
The Court’s particular hostility to content-based restrictions stems 
from three factors: distortion of public debate, improper legislative 
motivation for the ban, and the adverse consequences the restrictions 
tend to have on the speech’s communicative impact.193 Content-based 
burdens distort public debate by effectively eliminating competing 
viewpoints or ideas from the marketplace; essentially entrenching the 
status quo.194 Additionally, the Court has consistently held that the 
government cannot ban a message simply because it disapproves of 
it,195 or because it fears the impact the message will have on its 
audience, or that the public will not be able to act intelligently in 
response to the message.196  
2. Subject-Matter Restrictions 
At first glance, open meeting laws would seem to fit within this 
content-based framework. And the panel opinion in Rangra thought 
just that.197 In that case, TOMA required: “Every regular, special, or 
                                                                                                                 
191 Id. at 194–95.  
192 Id. at 196–97. See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all 
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because 
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).  
193 Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 182, at 254–56.  
194 See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 184, at 199–200. See also Frederick Schauer, 
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981) 
(discussing the use of categories in first amendment legal analysis).  
195 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (“The point of the First 
Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing 
speech on the basis of its content.”). 
196 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(The Framers “believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and 
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate 
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is 
an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental 
principle of the American government.”).  
197 Rangra v. Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 2009), dismissed as moot en banc by 584 
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called meeting of a governmental body shall be open to the public, 
except as provided by this chapter.”198 Open meetings, under this 
statute, are those to which the public has access.199 All other meetings 
are “closed” meetings.200 The problem identified by the Fifth Circuit 
panel concerned the penalty TOMA imposed: any member who 
participated in a “closed meeting” was subject to a fine of up to $500 
and/or imprisonment of up to six months.201 The court reasoned that 
this was a content-based regulation on the elected officials’ speech 
and the law, therefore, had to satisfy strict scrutiny.202  
While, superficially, the distinction between content-neutral and 
content-based restrictions seems straightforward, there are several 
subcategories within the content-based realm that the courts afford 
various levels of protection.203 Chief among these (for the purpose of 
evaluating open meeting laws) are subject-matter restrictions. 
Subject-matter restrictions “are directed, not at particular ideas, 
viewpoints, or items of information, but at entire subjects of 
expression.”204  
Open meeting laws appear to fall more in-line with subject-matter 
restrictions, rather than content-based ones. The laws are directed, not 
at the particular ideas being expressed, but at entire subjects of 
expression.205 The applicability of the law turns not on whether the 
elected official is Republican, Democrat, Green, or Libertarian, but on 
whether he discusses the public business before the body at all (or 
whatever else his particular state statute prohibits).  
                                                                                                                 
 
F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2009) (“We agree with the plaintiffs that the criminal provisions of TOMA 
are content-based regulations of speech that require the state to satisfy the strict-scrutiny test in 
order to uphold them.”).  
198 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.002 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). Ohio’s provides: “All 
meetings of any public body are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times.” 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(C) (West 1994 & Supp. 2009). In fact, most states use very 
similar phrasing. SCHWING, supra note 11, § 6.4, at 256–57.  
199 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.001(5). 
200 Id. § 551.001(1). There are some exceptions for “executive sessions,” but these are 
rather limited. See id.  
201 Id.§ 551.144; Rangra, 566 F.3d at 521–22.  
202 See Rangra, 566 F.3d at 521–22.  
203 See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 184, at 251 (“Careful scrutiny of these 
ambiguous restrictions [which do not fit within the content-based, content-neutral dichotomy] 
reveals an almost bewildering array of easily masked analytic refinements and distinctions.”).  
204 Id. at 239.  
205 In the case of TOMA, the law is directed at “a deliberation between a quorum of a 
governmental body, or between a quorum of a governmental body and another person, during 
which public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or 
control is discussed or considered.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.001(4). Ohio similarly 
targets the specific business of a public body. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (West 
1994 &Supp. 2010) (defining “meeting” as “any prearranged discussion of the public business 
of the public body by a majority of its members”). 
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This distinction between subject-matter and content-based 
restrictions is important because the two may entail different levels of 
scrutiny, depending upon the values the restriction impinges upon.206 
Professor Stone has argued that if the Court wishes to scrutinize 
subject-matter restrictions in the same manner as content-based 
restrictions, it should be guarding against the same evils—distortion 
of debate, improper legislative motivation, and communicative 
impact.207  
Following this line of reasoning, the dangers of open meeting laws 
do not seem to align perfectly with the dangers of content-based 
restrictions. The laws are not designed to silence a particular side of 
the debate; they simply prohibit elected officials from having the 
debate at all unless certain conditions are met. In other words, open 
meeting laws appear to be viewpoint-neutral. Their enforcement does 
not act to disadvantage any one “side” of the debate. Similarly, open 
meeting laws do not appear to stem from an improper legislative 
motivation (though it is interesting to note that so few legislatures 
have subjected themselves to the constraints of their state’s open 
meeting law). And open meeting laws seem to have little or no 
relation to the communicative impact of the message; elected officials 
can still, ultimately, communicate their message, so long as the 
“meeting” is open to the public. But, at the same time, they are not 
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions because they 
regulate speech based upon its content. So, it seems that evaluating 
open meeting laws as subject-matter restrictions is the appropriate 
course of action.  
But, as appealing as this line of reasoning may be, the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on the subject-matter–content-based distinction 
is rather murky.208 Perhaps the closest a majority of the Court has 
come to endorsing the distinction was in Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
Public Service Commission.209 In Consolidated Edison, the Court held 
unconstitutional the Public Service Commission’s order banning 
electric utilities from including information about controversial 
                                                                                                                 
206 Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 184, at 241–42; Stone, Subject-Matter 
Restrictions, supra note 182, at 108–15.  
207 Stone, Subject-Matter Restrictions, supra note 182.  
208 See John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1123 (2005) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has never overruled the line of authority disfavoring subject-matter 
classifications, and the Court continues to hold many such laws unconstitutional under the 
standard of strict scrutiny.”). But see Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based 
on its substantive content or the message it conveys.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
381 (1992) (invalidating a city ordinance because “it prohibits otherwise permitted speech 
solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”).  
209 447 U.S. 530 (1980).  
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political topics in their billing statements.210 The Commission had 
allowed “inserts that present[ed] certain information to consumers on 
certain subjects,” but it forbade “the use of inserts that discuss[ed] 
public controversies.”211 The Commission attempted to defend the 
restriction using several theories, including arguing that the ban was a 
content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction, or that it was a 
permissible subject-matter restriction.212 The Court rejected each of 
these arguments in turn, noting that “[g]overnmental action that 
regulates speech on the basis of its subject matter ‘slip[s] from the 
neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about 
content.’”213 Additionally, the Court held that this was not one of the 
“narrow circumstances” where subject-matter regulation was 
permissible.214 
The Supreme Court elaborated on of these “narrow circumstances” 
in a footnote, explaining: “when courts are asked to determine 
whether a species of speech is covered by the First Amendment, they 
must look to the content of expression.”215 Here, though, the Court 
appears to have only been concerned with discerning classifications 
of low-value speech, such as commercial speech, libel, obscenity, 
fighting words, or indecent speech.216 The Court also distinguished 
cases such as Greer v. Spock217 and Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights218 as instances of private parties asserting a right of access to 
public facilities, rather than as cases where the government prohibited 
a person from using his own resources to disseminate a message on a 
disfavored subject.219 
But instead of looking at this problem through the lens of access 
rights, courts should distinguish between the two flavors of subject-
matter restrictions: those that perpetuate the evils of content-based 
restrictions, and those that operate more like content-neutral bans. 
This would clarify the problem courts face when evaluating open 
meeting laws. For example, when the Fifth Circuit in Rangra 
                                                                                                                 
210 Id.  
211 Id. at 537.  
212 See id. at 535. 
213 Id. at 536 (quoting Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972)) (alteration in 
original).  
214 Id. at 538.  
215 Id. at 538 n.5. 
216 Id. 
217 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding federal prohibition of partisan political speech on 
military bases, even though bases could choose to allow civilian speakers on other topics).  
218 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion) (upholding the City Transit System’s ban on 
political advertising on busses, even though it allowed commercial advertising).  
219 See  Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540 (“[T]he Commission’s attempt to restrict 
the free expression of a private party cannot be upheld by reliance upon precedent that rests on 
the special interests of a government in overseeing the use of its property.”).  
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confronted the issue, it felt compelled to apply strict scrutiny because 
the law looked like a content-based restriction on speech. Analyzing 
the law as what it actually is (a subject-matter restriction) however, 
would allow for a more nuanced—and accurate—analysis of the 
impact of the law, and would ultimately open up a bevy of options for 
reviewing courts, rather than forcing them to apply a categorical 
strict-scrutiny analysis. Indeed, Justice Stevens appears to have 
recognized this distinction in his concurrence to R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul.220  
B. Determining the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny 
By correctly identifying subject-matter restrictions as such, the 
Court can avail itself of more nuanced standards of review, while at 
the same time respecting precedent. But adopting Professor Stone’s 
distinction between subject-matter and content-based restrictions will 
not entirely dispose of the problem, due to the two different flavors of 
subject-matter restrictions: those that mimic the effects of content-
based restrictions and those that have effects similar to content-
neutral restrictions. But even if the reviewing court treats those 
subject-matter restrictions that narrowly restrict speech on specific 
issues (like the Mosely ordinance, which focused only on labor 
speech) as content-based restrictions, and those which sweep more 
broadly (which, by implication, remove the possibility of illicit 
legislative motive) as content-neutral restrictions, this still will not 
address the harms effected by broad-based open meeting laws.  
What is required is an approach that will give courts flexibility in 
their analysis, and enable them to ferret out those laws truly adverse 
to the core values of the First Amendment. If the court identifies 
certain risks at play in a law that track closely with those of traditional 
content-based restrictions (i.e., distortion of debate, improper 
legislative motive, and restrictive communicative impact), then it can 
appropriately apply strict scrutiny. This is especially apposite if the 
subject-matter restriction appears to be viewpoint-based. If, however, 
the law operates in a more content-neutral manner (i.e., there is not 
                                                                                                                 
220 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“More particularly to the matter of 
content-based regulations, we have implicitly distinguished between restrictions on expression 
based on subject matter and restrictions based on viewpoint, indicating that the latter are 
particularly pernicious.”). Justices Stevens and Kennedy seem to be engaged in an interesting 
debate over this issue. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I adhere to my view, however, that content-based speech restrictions 
that do not fall within any traditional exception should be invalidated without inquiry into 
narrow tailoring or compelling government interests. . . . The political speech of candidates is at 
the heart of the First Amendment, and direct restrictions on the content of candidate speech are 
simply beyond the power of government to impose.”).  
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much concern about viewpoint discrimination, the law only burdens 
one mode of expression, etc.), then the court can apply a less exacting 
method of scrutiny.221  
Although the Supreme Court has generally applied this more 
flexible balancing approach to most content-neutral restrictions, it has 
employed strict scrutiny when dealing with some particularly 
offensive ones.222 Although this type of heightened review is rare, it 
tends to come into play when a law acts to shut off not just one mode 
of communication (like most content-neutral restrictions) but several 
or all means of expressing an idea.223 Therefore, simply discerning 
whether the dangers of a particular subject-matter restriction more 
closely approximate those of a content-based or content-neutral 
restriction does not end our inquiry.224 Instead, we must take an 
approach similar to a continuum, and look to the various levels of 
analysis the Court has afforded the different forms of restrictions, 
based upon the dangers each seeks to prevent, and then proceed to 
align these with the subject-matter restriction at hand.225  
IV. ANALYZING OPEN MEETING LAWS 
Citizens have an interest in knowing the actions of their elected 
representatives; how else can the public evaluate their performance 
come election time? But representatives have just as great an interest 
in informing the electorate of their activities; how else are we to 
reelect them? The problem lies in the fact that much of the public 
does not trust (or, at least, has been led to believe that they should not 
trust) those in office. Many of the open meeting laws were knee-jerk 
reactions, either to Watergate specifically or some other, more local, 
scandal.226 But these attempts at reassuring an apprehensive electorate 
                                                                                                                 
221 For a discussion on the various levels of review the Court has given content-neutral 
restrictions, see Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 184.  
222 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating the expenditure limitations 
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 that forbid any person from spending more than 
$1,000 on the campaign of any political candidate).  
223 See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 182, at 58–60.  
224 See Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to 
Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1405 (2006) (“[A]s to 
both of these concerns [(viewpoint and subject-matter restrictions)], it is clear that they cannot 
be properly assessed in a vacuum looking just at the content-based character of a restriction. As 
discussed earlier, one must also assess other characteristics of a speech regulation, such as its 
temporal, spatial, or other breadth of application, and the nature of the burden being placed on 
engaging in the regulated expression.”). 
225 See Schauer, supra note 193, at 299 (“There is a spectrum rather than a dichotomy. The 
question is not whether we permit judges to balance in the particular case, but rather how much 
authority the governing rule should allocate to the judge to take account of the particular 
circumstances of the case at hand.”).  
226 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
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often required subsequent amendments to account for such things as 
informal discussions that, upon further reflection by state legislatures, 
were later deemed more valuable when held in private.227  
There is no question that public bodies should take any and all 
official action in public. But laws like TOMA, which require every 
discussion between a quorum of members of an elected body 
regarding any issue that could conceivably come before the body be 
held in an “open” meeting, go too far.228 The following Section views 
open meeting laws as subject-matter restrictions, and proceeds to 
apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to the laws of Texas and Ohio.  
A. Analysis of Texas’ Open Meeting Law 
The most troubling aspect of open meeting laws that reach as 
broadly as TOMA is that they whittle down an elected official’s 
opportunity to communicate (especially with his elected colleagues) 
to one defined instance: the open meeting. To compound the problem, 
the State does not always clearly define when that instance occurs. 
Normally it depends on interpreting other terms, such as “meeting” or 
“deliberation” or some other qualifying factor. This interpretation is 
often not done by the legislature, but rather, when the statute requires 
the imposition of criminal penalties, the executive (in the form of the 
prosecutor). Additionally, the imposition of criminal penalties—
including imprisonment—creates a substantial chilling effect on the 
speech of elected officials, the individuals among whom we most 
want to create the conditions for free debate. But laws like TOMA 
foster the possibility that an aggressive executive, in conjunction with 
a potentially hostile judiciary, could encroach upon the legislative 
branch—not unlike the encroachment the Framers sought to prevent 
by enacting the Speech or Debate Clause.  
1. TOMA Generally 
Although the hallmarks of content-based burdens (viewpoint 
discrimination, distortion of public debate, or illicit legislative 
motive) are not glaringly present, TOMA does limit all means of 
                                                                                                                 
227 For example, Florida’s open meetings law currently has around 85 exemptions. Sandra 
F. Chance & Christina Locke, The Government-in-the-Sunshine Law Then and Now: A Model 
for Implementing New Technologies Consistent with Florida’s Position as a Leader in Open 
Government, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245, 260 (2008).  
228 See SCHWING, supra note 11, § 6.6, at 259 (“Members of local public bodies, however, 
may be unable to live normal lives if they risk violating the open meeting law every time they 
attend a PTA meeting, go to worship, shop for groceries, or attend a wedding or party. Strict 
enforcement of an all encompassing statute would ensure that virtually no one would be willing 
to serve on local public bodies.”).  
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expression—not just speech by mail, or telephone, but all of it—on 
political subjects in a large number of instances. Any time a quorum 
of a public body is together, and the meeting is not “open”229 (or does 
not fall within one of the “executive session” exceptions),230 the 
members violate the open meeting act if they even discuss any 
“public business or public policy over which the governmental body 
has supervision or control.”231 In order to “open” the meeting (or even 
have a legal closed one), the members must give notice to the public, 
which requires a posting “in a place readily accessible to the general 
public at all times for at least 72 hours before the scheduled time of 
the meeting.”232 What is most troubling about this is that the Texas 
Attorney General’s Handbook on Open Meetings warns that the State 
will apply the open meetings law even to informal gatherings of 
officials if they discuss public business.233  
Assume two of a town’s three elected city councilpersons (call 
them A and B) are standing in line at the supermarket on a Saturday 
morning. The line is long; five or six persons deep, and A and B are 
standing next to each other at the end. The matters of public policy 
over which a city council has control are so numerous as to defy any 
attempt to quantify them. Yet A and B can discuss none of these 
topics. For instance, assume the town’s high school football team won 
their game the night before and finished the regular season 
undefeated. Can A turn around and, without violating the open 
meeting law, say to B: “Hey, did you see the football team won last 
night? That’s our first undefeated season in school history! We should 
do something to recognize them. Let’s write a resolution 
congratulating them!”? What if, instead of A posing the idea then, the 
resolution was already on the agenda for a council meeting the 
following Monday. Could A and B discuss the football team at all, 
knowing that the resolution is pending?234  
                                                                                                                 
229 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.041 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (“A governmental body 
shall give written notice of the date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held by the 
governmental body.”).  
230 See generally id. §§ 551.071–088 (listing acceptable reasons for entering executive 
session). 
231 Id. § 551.001(4)(A).  
232 Id. § 551.043.  
233 ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., OPEN MEETINGS 2010 HANDBOOK 18 (2010), available at 
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/AG_Publications/pdfs/openmeeting_hb.pdf (“When a quorum of the 
members of a governmental body assembles in an informal setting, such as a social occasion, it 
will be subject to the requirements of the Act if the members engage in a verbal exchange about 
public business or policy.”).  
234 Cf. Gardner v. Herring, 21 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, 2000) (genuine issue of 
material fact existed as to whether an open meeting violation occurred where president of a 
school board informed a “congregation” of the board about a lawsuit that had just been filed 
against her in her official capacity and some members of the board remarked that this was 
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Obviously this is an absurd example. But it illustrates the absurdity 
of the law. A and B could spend six months in jail and pay a fine of 
$500 for talking about football while standing in line at the grocery 
store.  
2. First Amendment Analysis 
Rangra v. Brown serves as a good test case for analyzing 
TOMA.235 The Fifth Circuit treated TOMA as a content-based 
restriction “because whether a quorum of public officials may 
communicate with each other outside of an open meeting depends on 
whether the content of their speech refers to ‘public business or public 
policy over which the governmental body has supervision or 
control.’”236 While this is by no means an incorrect interpretation 
(especially in light of the Supreme Court’s affinity for the content-
based–content-neutral dichotomy), “[n]ot all content-based 
regulations are alike; [the Supreme Court] clearly recognize[s] that 
some content-based restrictions raise more constitutional questions 
than others.”237  
Elected officials should be entitled to greater First Amendment 
protection than other government employees.238 Open meeting laws 
clearly burden a type of core (or “high value”) speech: political.239 
They regulate what elected officials can say about politics. But they 
are not so invidious as to warrant strict scrutiny. Instead, courts 
should utilize Justice Stevens’ formulation in R.A.V. That way, in 
addition to looking at the type of expression burdened, courts 
evaluating open meeting laws would also examine: 1) the nature of 
the restriction, 2) the context surrounding the restriction, and 3) the 
scope of the restriction.240 This deviation from traditional “strict” 
                                                                                                                 
 
“regrettable”). Even though the resolution is non-binding, it is an official act of the 
governmental body on a matter of public concern. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. DM-95 (March 4, 
1992), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/48morales/op/1992/pdf/dm 
0095.pdf (advising that if a quorum of a governmental body issued a signed “joint statement” on 
a subject falling within TOMA, the deliberations leading to the creation of the joint statement 
must occur in an open meeting). Thus, it would qualify as official business under Texas law. 
235 See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text for the facts of Rangra.  
236 Rangra v. Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 522 (2009) dismissed as moot en banc by 584 F.3d 206 
(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.001 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010)).  
237 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 429 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
238 See supra Part II.B–C.  
239 See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (noting that, in the realm of 
political expression, First Amendment protection is “at its zenith”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 39 (1976) (holding that campaign expenditure restrictions “limit political expression ‘at the 
core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.’” (quoting Williams v. 
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968))).  
240 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 429–32 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Ysursa v. Pocatello 
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scrutiny is not due to the fact that elected officials are government 
employees, but rather to the nature of the restriction at hand. Thus, if 
an open meeting law were applied to a completely “private” citizen, 
this is the same level of inquiry that courts should utilize.241  
a) TOMA as a Subject-Matter Restriction 
As discussed above, TOMA is a subject-matter restriction.242 It 
constrains elected officials’ ability to communicate with their fellow 
legislators regarding “public business or public policy over which the 
governmental body has supervision or control” to one defined 
instance: the open meeting.243 Any violation results in a fine of up to 
$500 and imprisonment for up to six months.244 Whether these 
meetings are happenstance (in the supermarket, at a coffee shop, at 
the high school football game, etc.), inadvertent (clicking “reply all” 
to an email), or completely intentional (the proverbial “smoke-filled 
backroom”) is of no matter. The law focuses on whether elected 
officials speak on a disfavored subject, at disfavored times, and under 
disfavored conditions.  
TOMA, however, does not appear to rise to the extreme level of 
the subject-matter restriction in Mosely, as the legislature’s asserted 
purpose is to enhance government, not restrict viewpoint. Indeed, the 
law appears to be applied evenhandedly, not based upon what view 
the elected official is espousing, merely whether or not he is talking 
about the disfavored subject at a “closed” meeting. Thus, there does 
                                                                                                                 
 
Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1103 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that, when 
competing constitutional interests are at play, the court should consider “[1] the seriousness of 
the speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, [2] the importance of the provision's 
countervailing objectives, [3] the extent to which the statute will tend to achieve those 
objectives, and [4] whether there are other less restrictive ways of doing so”); Nixon v. Shrink 
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[W]here a law 
significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways—the 
Court has closely scrutinized the statute's impact on those interests, but refrained from 
employing a simple test that effectively presumes unconstitutionality. Rather, it has balanced 
interests. And in practice that has meant asking whether the statute burdens any one such 
interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon the others.”).  
241 If, however, courts reject the distinction between subject-matter restrictions and full-out 
content-based restrictions, then they should proceed to evaluate open meeting laws using the 
traditional method of strict scrutiny. My point is that the seemingly lower level of inquiry I 
utilize here has nothing to do with the fact that the individuals at issue are elected officials; it is 
the same level that I would apply to any subject-matter restriction that operates to choke off all 
forms of communication with regard to a disfavored subject.   
242 See supra Part III.A.ii.  
243 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.001(4) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).  
244 Id. § 551.144(b).  
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not appear to be an invidious governmental motive behind the 
restriction.  
Whether TOMA distorts debate is a more complex question. True, 
open meetings laws affect only the members of public bodies subject 
to the act. As such, one could argue that the impact on public debate 
is minimal. But this would be a narrow view indeed. Rather, TOMA 
distorts the debate. It prevents our elected legislators from fleshing 
out their positions on public issues with each other. Instead, they are 
often forced to debate issues behind closed doors with their aids and 
staff. But, why not just have the debate in the open meeting with their 
elected colleagues? As Professor Welborn’s study suggests—and 
what our infatuation with the 24-hour news media has likely 
enhanced—the risk of embarrassment a member faces from appearing 
ill-informed at a public meeting (like, when he’s seeing an issue of 
first impression) or, worse, “flip flopping” on a position after being 
persuaded by a thoughtful, intellectual discussion with a fellow 
elected representative at an open meeting, likely dissuades even the 
most boisterous representative with even an inkling of wanting to be 
reelected.245 This results in an “open meeting” that is no more than a 
perfunctory exercise and devoid of any real discussion.  
Finally, as Rangra illustrates, TOMA chokes off all forms of 
communication on its disfavored subject. Whether the chosen method 
be email, telephone, letter, in person, probably even smoke signal, is 
of no moment. All communication between a quorum or more of an 
elected body is forbidden unless the meeting is “open.” Such a broad 
sweep takes TOMA squarely out of the content neutral designation, 
and elevates it to a more disfavored position.246  
b) The Context Surrounding TOMA Suggests Invalidation 
“If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from 
fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply 
engaging in political speech.”247 TOMA’s criminal penalties and 
overreaching definition of “meeting,” which leads to unnecessary 
nuance, create a significant chilling effect on elected officials’ speech. 
Against this backdrop, any potentially asserted justifications of 
efficient or effective functioning of government or of combating the 
appearance or existence of corruption prove unavailing.  
                                                                                                                 
245 See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text. 
246 Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“A regulation that serves 
purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral . . . . Government regulation 
of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is justified without reference to the content 
of the regulated speech.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
247 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010).  
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Here, the criminal penalties (particularly imprisonment) are not 
necessary to the proper functioning of open meeting laws. In 
actuality, few states allow judges to imprison violators of an open 
meeting law.248 At least sixteen states do not authorize criminal 
penalties for violations of their open meetings law at all.249 This 
shows that criminal penalties, particularly imprisonment, are not 
necessary to the proper and effective functioning of open meeting 
laws.250  
Furthermore, the lawsuits themselves (particularly, Rangra and, 
more recently, City of Alpine v. Abbott251) further evince a finding that 
TOMA chills elected officials’ speech. The councilpersons in Rangra 
sued to prevent the local district attorney from indicting them again 
over fears that their emails violated TOMA. The suit in City of Alpine 
consists of three Texas cities and at least sixteen elected officials who 
fear prosecution for a violation of TOMA.252  
This fear is enhanced by the incredibly broad reach of the law 
resulting from the definition of “meeting.” For instance, one Texas 
Attorney General’s Opinion advises, “agenda preparation procedures 
may not involve deliberations among a quorum of members of a 
governmental body except in a public meeting for which notice has 
been posted in accordance with the act.”253 This is essentially what 
the councilpersons in Rangra were indicted for: using a series of 
emails to arrange a special meeting and discussing the purpose 
thereof. 
Another advisory opinion argued:  
If a quorum of a governmental body agrees on a joint 
statement on a matter of such business or policy, the 
deliberation by which that agreement is reached is subject to 
the requirements of the act, and those requirements are not 
                                                                                                                 
248 See SCHWING, supra note 11, § 8.60, at 511 n.266. While not purporting to list every 
state that imposes criminal punishment, it only lists seven separate states that have 
imprisonment as an available sanction. Id.  
249 Id. § 8.58, at 509. These include: Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Virginia, and Washington. Id.  
250 Cf. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908–09 (“The anticorruption interest is not sufficient 
to displace the speech here in question. Indeed, 26 States do not restrict independent 
expenditures by for-profit corporations. The Government does not claim that these expenditures 
have corrupted the political process in those States.”).  
251 730 F. Supp. 2d. 630 (W.D. Tex. 2010).  
252 The City of Big Lake withdrew as a plaintiff. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, City of 
Alpine¸730 F. Supp. 2d 630 (No. P:09-CV-59), 2010 WL 516941.  
253 Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. DM-473, at 3 (Apr. 13, 1998), available at http://www.oag.state. 
tx.us/opinions/opinions/48morales/op/1998/pdf/dm0473.pdf.  
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necessarily avoided by avoiding the physical gathering of a 
quorum in one place at one time.254  
Yet another advisory opinion provides that the members of a 
commissioner’s court cannot sign or approve an invoice, claim, or bill 
unless such action occurs at an open meeting.255  
In a word, these restrictions are silly. Elected officeholders should 
not have to be looking over their shoulders for the district attorney 
every time they prepare an agenda. Nor should the district attorney 
have to police such a trivial matter as whether the city council 
correctly met in an open meeting before issuing a joint statement. All 
of this comes into greater focus when we remember that these bodies 
are often small city and town councils that “may not have legal 
representation at their meetings and may depend on volunteers 
serving without pay or with minimal compensation, so that criminal 
penalties may be perceived to be excessive and to deter public 
service.”256 
c) TOMA’s Scope May be Narrow, but It Has a Potent Impact  
on the Level and Quality of Political Debate 
TOMA extends only to those situations where elected members of 
a governmental body are talking about the public business under their 
jurisdiction while in the presence of a quorum. But the law’s sweep is 
what is most disconcerting. While Texas may argue that TOMA 
merely regulates the efficient functioning of the government,257 or 
that the appearance and prevention of corruption are sufficiently 
substantial interests to justify the burdens imposed by the statute,258 
the facts belie this claim.  
Statutes as onerous as TOMA, in all likelihood, do more to hinder 
efficient and effective government than they do to promote it. They 
drive substantive discussions about policy—which used to and should 
                                                                                                                 
254 Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. DM-95 at 5-6 (Mar. 4, 1992), available at http://www.oag.state. 
tx.us/opinions/opinions/48morales/op/1992/pdf/dm0095.pdf.  
255 Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. JC-0307, at 1–2 (Nov. 20, 2000), available at 
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/49cornyn/op/2000/pdf/JC0307.pdf.  
256 SCHWING, supra note 11, § 8.60, at 510.  
257 Cf. Parker v. Merlino, 646 F.2d 848, 854 (3rd Cir. 1981) (holding that the New Jersey 
State Senate’s procedural rules governing debate are not unconstitutional because the State has a 
substantial interest in ensuring the efficient functioning of its legislature); Kucinich v. Forbes, 
432 F. Supp. 1101, 1114 n.18 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (noting that the efficient functioning of council 
is a substantial interest which may allow for regulation of speech).  
258 Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (“The contribution ceilings thus serve the 
basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly 
impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and 
discussion.”).  
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take place among the elected officials—to conference rooms with 
staffs and aides.259 Any substantive debate on even the most menial of 
resolutions, joint statements,260 or even the meeting’s agenda,261 
requires an open meeting. Or, in the event that a governmental body 
requires, for instance, two of the three elected commissioners to sign 
an invoice before the treasury will pay it, an open meeting is 
required.262 Unless these discussions fall into one of a few 
exceptions,263 they must be conducted in accordance with TOMA, 
which requires them to post notice of the “meeting” at least 72 hours 
in advance.264 So our three-member, “effective and efficient” town 
council can’t pay its bills, issue a joint statement, or set its agenda 
without a 72-hour lag period.  
Furthermore, the efficacy of open meeting laws is dubious to begin 
with.265 Many were passed in the wake of Watergate to placate an 
irate press and reassure a petulant electorate.266 It is with this history 
in mind that a court must weigh the public’s interest in avoiding the 
appearance of corruption, against the significant burdens to our 
representatives’ free speech rights. What’s more, some believe that it 
is mere folly for a court to attempt to divine what influences a 
particular legislator in the first place. As one court noted:  
The mental gymnastics of each legislator operates in an 
unpredictable universe of its own, unfettered by law. Such 
mental operations are not confined to moments when all are 
assembled on the public stage. Any attempt to control them 
has no probability of success, constitutes an interference with 
the power of a separate branch of government and interferes 
with personal rights of privacy.267 
                                                                                                                 
259 See supra Part I.B.  
260 Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. DM-95 (Mar. 4, 1992), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/ 
opinions/opinions/48morales/op/1992/pdf/dm0095.pdf.  
261 Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. DM-473 (Apr. 13, 1998), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/ 
opinions/opinions/48morales/op/1998/pdf/dm0473.pdf.  
262 Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. JC-0307 (Nov. 20, 2000), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/ 
opinions/opinions/49cornyn/op/2000/pdf/JC0307.pdf.   
263 For example, TOMA permits an exception to the general rule requiring 72 hours notice 
in “emergency” situations. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.045 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). 
“Emergency” is confined to either “an imminent threat to public health or safety” or “a 
reasonably unforeseeable situation.” Even here, the meeting still requires two hours notice. Id.  
264 Id. § 551.043(a). 
265 See supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.  
266 From 1972 to 1973, 19 states either enacted (for the first time) open meetings laws or 
strengthened already existing ones. SCHWING, supra note 11, at 3–4.  
267 Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 259 N.E.2d 522, 530 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
1970), aff’d, 274 N.E.2d 766 (Ohio App. 2d 1971). 
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Another court notes: “There are, of course, some activities, legal if 
engaged in by one, yet illegal if performed in concert with others, but 
political expression is not one of them.”268 The only exception is 
combating the appearance of (or actual) corruption on the part of 
public officials.269 In certain circumstances, fighting the appearance 
of impropriety is a compelling interest that, if narrowly tailored, will 
support restrictions on speech.270 But TOMA fails this narrow 
tailoring requirement. It is nowhere near narrowly tailored to serve 
the interest of combating perceived or actual impropriety. Other states 
achieve the same objective with a much narrower definition of 
meeting.271 Furthermore, criminalizing TOMA violations serves to 
chill an unnecessary amount of speech that is, in all likelihood, 
unrelated to the statute’s goal of preventing the appearance of 
corruption. “Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing 
space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with 
narrow specificity.”272 This is especially true when laws that may be 
vague273 impose criminal penalties for a violation. In such cases, 
“[c]lose examination of the specificity of the statutory limitation is 
required where . . . the legislation imposes criminal penalties in an 
area permeated by First Amendment interests.”274 TOMA also 
empowers the executive to enforce it, a power that the Founders 
feared when they drafted the Speech or Debate Clause. This risk of 
encroachment on the legislative branch by an overzealous executive 
(who has the power to impose criminal sanctions on legislators) is 
further reason to strike down the criminal provisions of TOMA. 
Because TOMA is a subject-matter restriction that chokes off all 
mediums of communication on political speech, unless certain 
conditions are met, and imposes criminal sanctions for any violation, 
                                                                                                                 
268 Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981). 
269 Id. at 296–97 (“Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on 
political activity were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception 
of undue influence of large contributors to a candidate.”).  
270 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–76, 777 n.7 (2002) (noting 
that while upholding the appearance of impartiality and actual impartiality are compelling 
interests, Minnesota’s statute was not narrowly tailored to serve those interests); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (“[T]he Act's primary purpose—to limit the actuality and 
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions [. . . is] a 
constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation.”). 
271 See, e.g., infra Part IV.B. 
272 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 311 (1940)).  
273 See, e.g., Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. GA-0326 (May 18, 2005), available at 
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/50abbott/op/2005/pdf/ga0326.pdf (responding to 
an inquiry about whether TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 551.143 is unconstitutionally vague).  
Although the opinion concluded that the law was not vague, it is curious that it had to be issued 
at all. 
274 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40–41.  
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it unconstitutionally impinges upon the free speech rights of elected 
officials and cannot stand.  
B. Analysis of Ohio’s Open Meeting Law 
Ohio’s open meeting law (OML) contrasts starkly with TOMA. 
Ohio confines a “meeting” to “any prearranged discussion of the 
public business of the public body by a majority of its members.”275 
By limiting “meetings” to “prearranged” discussions, it avoids the 
chance encounters that could easily occur in Texas and states with 
similar laws. And, Ohio has no specific method for notice, and no 
minimum time that notice has to be posted. Rather, each body is 
responsible for maintaining a rule that provides for “reasonable” 
methods of providing notice.276 And no body can call a “special” 
meeting unless they provide 24-hour notice to any media outlets and 
interested persons who have requested advance notice of any special 
meetings.277 Courts must void any action taken in a meeting that 
violates the OML and force the offending body to pay a civil 
forfeiture of $500 to the plaintiff.278 Furthermore, any official action 
that derived from deliberations held in violation of the OML is also 
void.279 Additionally, the body must pay court costs and the plaintiff’s 
reasonable attorney’s fees.280  
Ohio’s open meeting law, while still a subject-matter restriction, 
should survive a First Amendment challenge because it has a more 
circumscribed definition of “meeting” and lacks the chilling effect 
imposed by criminal sanctions.  
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Keep in mind that this Note does not advocate changing the open 
meeting laws with regard to administrative agencies or other bodies 
that do not include elected public officials. Under the Garcetti 
rationale, those limitations appear to be permissible.281 Nor does it 
                                                                                                                 
275 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(B)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2010). 
276 Id. § 121.22(F). 
277 Id. 
278 Id. § 121.22(I) 
279 Id. § 121.22(H) (“A resolution, rule, or formal action adopted in an open meeting that 
results from deliberations in a meeting not open to the public is invalid unless the deliberations 
were for a purpose specifically authorized in division (G) or (J) of this section and conducted at 
an executive session held in compliance with this section.”).  
280 Id. § 121.22(I).  
281 They are also, arguably, more soundly grounded in policy. Agencies are, for the most 
part, “agents” of the legislature, tasked by the legislature with carrying out specific functions in 
a designated area. The legislative body’s interest in observing their operations and ensuring their 
proper functioning is heightened by the different nature of the relationship.  
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counsel the skirting of open meetings by elected officials. Our elected 
representatives should aspire to inform us not only of their decisions 
and official actions, but also the underlying rationale. Open meeting 
laws should simply serve to remind them of this duty, not to punish 
them for inadvertently violating it.  
Some may see a decision striking the criminal penalties from open 
meeting laws as a step back, a blow to open government. Or, perhaps, 
as encouraging elected officials to meet privately and revert to the 
days of the “backroom deal.” They may also argue that we will be 
less able to monitor our elected representatives. While these are 
plausible concerns, in reality they are likely to be overblown 
posturing.  
There is an easy fix to any of the above criticisms: vote for 
someone else. If you truly do not trust your representative to work in 
your interest, or if you think that he is going behind your back to 
strike deals that benefit him (and not you), you should vote for 
someone else. Those truly bent on conducting business in “smoke-
filled rooms” (i.e. the egregious offenders who are the targets of these 
laws) will do so despite an open meeting law,282 so the persons 
generally punished are those who either inadvertently violate the 
statute or those who are charged as a pretext for some other offense 
(which, as appears to be the case in Rangra, can be a political 
disagreement with some other member or branch of the government).  
The monitoring problem may still exist, but this is more than 
compensated for by most states’ freedom of information acts, and the 
remaining aspects of the open meeting law. I do not think anyone 
would question the wisdom of requiring any and all official actions of 
the government to be recorded and taken in public, which open 
meeting laws do. Additionally, most states’ freedom of information 
acts make the records of those decisions available for inspection.  
Deliberations should be uninhibited. States like Texas, with a 
broad definition of meeting (which encompass everything from staff 
briefings, to chance encounters at the supermarket, to actual, 
convened formal meetings), should narrow their statutes to envelope a 
more realistic number of discussions, preferably only those that are 
prearranged and where decisions are generally made. This would still 
serve the purpose of open meeting laws (by keeping the public 
informed about the official actions of their governments), while at the 
same time enabling elected representatives to debate the merits of an 
                                                                                                                 
282 Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (“[N]o substantial societal interest would 
be served by a loophole-closing provision designed to check corruption that permitted 
unscrupulous persons and organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain 
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issue candidly, and without the pressure and fear of having their 
initial impressions of a proposal posted to the internet and streamed in 
real-time.  
States should similarly strike the criminal penalties that attach to 
violations. In many instances, the people serving in these elected 
capacities are our friends and neighbors, who do the job for little or 
no pay and usually even less appreciation. Having them run around 
frantic in search of an attorney to tell them whether the conversation 
they just had at the supermarket might put them in jail for the next six 
months is a great way to show our gratitude for their service to our 
community.  
CONCLUSION  
Elected officials enjoy the same free speech protections as private 
citizens. The government cannot regulate their speech outright 
without running afoul of the First Amendment. And, empowering one 
branch to police the speech of another (especially when the executive 
patrols the legislature) raises serious separation of powers concerns, 
and serves to unnecessarily chill the speech of legislators and inhibits 
robust, wide-open debate on controversial issues. With this in mind, 
the government cannot simply assert its “interests as an employer” to 
justify curtailing elected officials’ First Amendment rights. Their 
“employment” relationship is sufficiently different than other 
government employees, who are not elected or directly accountable to 
people. Therefore, courts must evaluate the constitutionality of open 
meeting laws (as applied to the speech of elected officials) as if they 
were evaluating the speech a private citizen, and not a public 
“employee” under the Garcetti test.  
Since elected officials have broad First Amendment rights, a 
court’s initial evaluation of these freedoms must look much the same 
as if those laws were being applied to a private citizen. Because open 
meeting laws completely eviscerate all means of communication with 
regard to political issues (except at certain, favored times), they 
should be treated as subject-matter restrictions, and not blindly 
evaluated under the strict-scrutiny analysis reserved for purely 
content-based regulations. Instead, the reviewing court must look to 
the underlying harms of the restriction, and inquire whether it was 
born of an illicit governmental motive, discriminates based upon 
viewpoint, or completely chokes off all means of communication on a 
specific subject. It must then look to the context of the regulation and 
its scope. In the case of TOMA, the broad sweep encompassed by the 
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definition of “meeting” and the imposition of criminal penalties on 
violators tend to point towards invalidation of the restrictions.  
In light of this analysis, states should take steps to remove the 
criminal sanctions accompanying their open meeting laws and 
consider narrowing the definition of “meeting,” so as to better 
facilitate debate amongst their elected representatives. While our First 
Amendment doctrine is by no means perfect, we should take care not 
to hamper the free speech of those we entrust to debate the merits of 
issues affecting the public welfare. Instead, we should foster 
conditions that allow them to conclude that is in the best interest of 
the general good. President Adams once wrote: “When people talk of 
the freedom of writing[,] speaking or thinking, I cannot choose but 
laugh. No such thing ever existed. No such thing now exists: but I 
hope it will exist. But it must be hundreds of years after you and I 
shall write and speak no more.”283 Today, we are closer to the 
existence of these freedoms than ever before; but they still do not yet 
exist. And they may never exist. But that does not mean that we 
should cease to aspire towards a time when those freedoms do exist in 
the way that our Founders envisioned.  
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